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1. Introduction       
“Yesterday I fell in love with people.  
Today I hope to start to adore them. [...] 
Only #euromaidan, just #hardcore. And let God help us,” 
(eds Myrhorodskiy & Savytska 2014:25). 
 
We live in a digital age, which has changed the way we obtain, perceive and 
share information. Recent communication developments have significantly altered the 
way information is being transmitted. Moreover, they have transformed our vision of 
power relations and signified an individual impact on the established system and vice 
versa. Throughout the beginning of the XXI century we have witnessed how 
communities worldwide have expressed their discontent and have mobilized 
themselves against incumbents by harnessing the power of ICT (information and 
communications technology).  
Social media platforms have been acknowledged as phenomena that require 
thorough research, as they appear to be drivers for social change. As soon as a new 
revolution occurs, we tend to immediately relate it to social media proliferation: the 
unforeseen is categorized to be the next “Facebook/Twitter/smartphone 
revolution/protest/demonstration/election” (Naughton 2013). Questions like “Does 
Facebook assist democracy building?” or “Should we award Twitter with a Nobel 
prize?” have become commonplace. By examining examples of social media usage 
during uprisings in, for instance, Belarus (2006), Iran (2009), the Middle East (2010-
2012), Hong Kong (2014-2015), we can analyze how society embraces technology to 
facilitate political change. This paper is focused on one of the most recent cases: the 
Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine (2013-2014).  
The name for this revolution takes its roots from “Euro” (meaning “Europe”) 
and maidan (“square” in the Ukrainian language) referring to Maidan Nezalezhnosti – 
the main square in Kyiv where the protests took place. The word itself is a neologism, 
coined as a hashtag on Twitter after Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych 
suspended signing of an Association Agreement with the European Union. That day, 
21
 
November 2013, became the start of a period of social unrest that has had pivotal 
consequences for the country’s governance, security and international relations.   
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The scale of the Euromaidan revolution was a surprise for both incumbents 
and international observers. Escalation in the number of participants is perceived as 
an unprecedented case in the history of Ukraine. This revolution can be compared 
with the Orange Revolution of 2004, yet a significant difference is in the way 
technology was embraced and used for mobilization and cooperation. Euromaidan, 
which sparked by the single act of suspending preparation to sign the Association 
Agreement expanded into a protest against corruption, censorship and restraints on 
freedom of expression. Months of resistance and violent clashes between protesters 
and police eventually culminated in the government’s resignation and Mr. 
Yanukovych’s impeachment on 22 February 2014. Reflecting back on the start of 
revolution, we might link mass mobilization to a variety of causes. Was it a single 
Facebook post by a well-known journalist as has been often claimed? Was it a 
tweeted call from an opposition leader? Or, perhaps, was it a series of shocking 
images and videos of police officers beating students that propelled the nation’s anger 
and motivated people to join the protesting forces?  
Researchers might praise new media claiming that the change of regime in 
Ukraine was due to ICTs. Usage of social media skyrocketed throughout the protests 
as a means of coordinating and assisting protesters in a number of ways providing 
transportation, food, shelter, finances and recommendations. Furthermore, new media 
emerged as an answer to biased and unreliable news transmitted by state-controlled 
media outlets. Crowds took news sharing into their own hands thus providing 
valuable information to their counterparts as well as to the international audience and 
mass media abroad. This puts digital media in the limelight as a catalyzer, a peace-
builder and a positive force that assists civil society in collaborating and managing a 
democratic change. Nevertheless, it is still to be determined whether the role of social 
media has not been overemphasized and if it can be perceived as a solely positive 
asset for social change. Therefore, this conundrum of social media’s role in 
revolutions is still to be studied and this paper aims to contribute to this discussion.  
This research paper will analyze the conflict in Kyiv from the beginning of the 
revolution (21 November 2013) until Mr. Yanukovych fled and a temporary 
president, Olexander Turchynov, was appointed (23 February 2014). This concise 
timeframe is necessary to examine social media’s involvement and its impact on the 
regime change in Ukraine. In this paper protests in the capital city are to be covered 
with references to the international outreach as a pivotal facet of social media’s role, 
and the speed of information sharing within the Ukrainian communities worldwide. 
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The focal inquiry is the role of social media in triggering and sustaining revolutions 
with all its implications, limitations and consequences. In order to answer this 
question, various features of Euromaidan have to be studied. The following 
subquestions have to be examined in order to draw conclusions about the impact of 
social media during the course of the Ukrainian revolution: what makes the 
Euromaidan revolution a unique case? What social media were utilized and how did 
the dynamics change throughout the uprising? Who was the average protester at the 
Euromaidan and what was his relation to social media? What were the potential 
benefits and risks of using social media for communication? How did social media 
contribute to strengthening civil society in Ukraine and the activism of diaspora 
residing in other countries?  
In the first section I will introduce the case examining social media’s novelty, 
spontaneity and its role as a trigger of mass mobilization. In the second section, 
evolvement of the revolution on social media with the emergence of new channels as 
well as shifts in social media usage will be explored. Further consideration will be 
given to what extent the revolution was guided by civil society and to what extent 
social media assisted it during the revolution. In addition, a portrait of a typical 
protester will be constructed according to surveys and polls, which will open a debate 
as to whether Euromaidan can be classified as a millennial revolution. The following 
two chapters will introduce the main debate between supporters and critics of social 
media in the context of the Ukrainian revolution. In addition, the relationship between 
printed, broadcast media and social media will be studied. The next section will 
introduce the pivotal question of whether weak social media connections can foster 
mobilization and active participation or whether the success of the numbers relies on 
personal connections. The following chapter will expand on our area of interest in 
strong and weak connections to the audience worldwide. How does social media 
enrich the global network of activists? To what extent can the global transformations 
affect the local practices and vice versa throughout the course of a social uprising?  
In the discussion section we will elaborate more on the linkage between online 
and offline activity, as well as on the praises and critiques of social media as a driver 
of social change. Furthermore, throughout the paper we will discuss the role of 
leadership and participation as well as draw parallels to the Orange Revolution of 
2004. This analysis will also examine what content is more influential and what can 
mobilize crowds to become activists.  
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This is a study of social media’s role in inducing an uprising, strengthening 
civil society and empowering political participation. By answering our questions we 
can evaluate the impact of social media in the Ukrainian case and, moreover, relate it 
to a global discussion about communication tools as triggers and supporters of 
revolutions.  
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
2.1 Theories and concepts 
In order to grasp the complexity of the studied phenomena we will take into 
account the existing theories about social mobilization, networks, information 
diffusion and communication tools that incite action. This theoretical framework was 
chosen according to its relevance to the case and its ability to illustrate global 
patterns. Due to a limited number of theories about social mobilization in the Internet 
era, in this paper we relate to pre-Internet models linking them to more recent 
concepts of networks, community building and social behavior online. In each section 
of the paper we elaborate on particular theories or concepts that are conducive to our 
study.  
Explaining what drives crowds to join the protests, we turn to the threshold 
models of collective behavior (Granovetter 1978); a preference falsification theory in 
an unanticipated political revolution (Kuran 1989) and informational cascades of a 
collective action (Lohmann 1994) that give a direction to our study. The Euromaidan 
is to be studied in regard to these theories and it is particularly important to what 
extent this revolution can confirm or cast doubt on the existent theoretical framework. 
A. Granovetter argues that it is not sufficient for a researcher to study beliefs, norms 
and motives of the protesters to join an uprising. At the beginning of a protest, 
according to the scholar, a person’s “threshold” – the number of people that have 
already joined, defines the likelihood of his participation. A. Granovetter’s threshold 
model is designed to study how various drivers interact and aggregate. Individual 
thresholds transform into a collective one through the course of a revolution as 
protesters “end up sharing the same norm or belief about the situation” (1978:1421). 
It is interesting in this respect to analyze the preference falsification theory (Kuran 
1989). T. Kuran applies “a collective choice model”, arguing that there is a clear 
distinction between the individual’s political preferences and those that they expose in 
public. When “a few individuals reach their boiling point”, an assumed stability is 
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shaken as the masses reveal their long-term accumulated frustration by joining an 
uprising (1989:61). In order to explain how the “boiling point” is reached and 
discontent is diffused, this paper elaborates on the informational cascades theory: a 
sequence of mass protests that challenge the status quo revealing information that was 
concealed (Lohmann 1994). In her model S. Lohmann’s compared communication to 
a “signaling game” in which a sender decides what information to disseminate to a 
receiver. The “game” occurs in three phases: society expresses its dissatisfaction with 
specific incumbents, informational signals are taken from the changes in the size of an 
uprising over time and the regime collapses if leaked information makes it lose public 
support (ibid: 49). This also relates to A. Granovetter’s considerations about the 
numbers of protesters as S. Lohmann outlines the necessity of collective action and 
collective beliefs to make a social uprising feasible. 
In the section on communication tools and community building, this study 
draws on the concepts of “weak ties” which occur online and potentially cannot 
propel an offline movement (Gladwell 2010), “small clusters” of people who share 
the same interests and beliefs (Faris 2008), a “mobile network society” that 
emphasizes “the diffusion of a networking logic” via digital technology (Castells, 
Fernandez-Ardevol & Qiu 2006:6) and social media as a platform for a “networked 
public sphere” and “networked horizontalism”, which appears to be a digital version 
of Habermasian understanding of the public sphere (Benkler 2006; Habermas 1991; 
Hill 2013). In order to evaluate the effectiveness of actions in the public sphere, one 
could study to what extent civil society is strong and whether it has to be strong to 
lead an uprising (Way 2014).  
In relation to state power harnessing technology for surveillance and content 
moderation, “liquid surveillance”, the term coined by Z. Bauman (2012), is 
introduced to distinguish surveillance that takes place on the World Wide Web. 
Conversely, the “cute cat theory” (Zuckerman 2008) and the “dictator’s dilemma” 
(Kedzie 2002) rationalize why state powers face obstacles in controlling and 
restricting the online flow of information.  
In accordance with one’s aim to see a broader perspective of an uprising’s 
facilitation and its consequences, this paper elaborates on A. Appadurai’s notion of 
scapes (1996): mediascapes and ideoscapes. Further considerations may include 
origination of “imagined communities” that are formed due to the absence of 
gatekeepers’ online control  (Darling 2008) as well as the digital diasporas that use 
ICT to connect and maintain a linkage with their country of origin (Brinkenhoff 
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2009). This could generate a further debate on the emergence of the Global Village 
(McLuhan 1966). It is particularly important though to be aware that McLuhan’s 
theory might require revisiting and further analysis as it was written before ICTs and 
social media proliferation. All the above-presented theories will be further discussed 
in the analysis section of this paper in relation to the study of the Euromaidan. 
 
2.2 Terminology 
There are a number of terms used throughout this study that might invoke 
various connotations therefore must be clarified in advance. By ICTs we mean 
information and communication technologies. This term was coined by D. Stevenson 
to reflect on “the increasing role of both information and communication technologies 
in all aspects of society” (1997:12). Slacktivism in this study stands for  “a feel-good 
online activism that has zero political or social impact” (Morozov 2009). 
Using the term “mass media” we refer to communication channels aimed at a 
large number of people dispersed geographically that operate in a one-way and 
impersonal manner (McLuhan 1966). “Social media” in this study means 
“technologies, platforms, and services that enable individuals to engage in 
communication from one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-many” (Encyclopedia 
Britannica). A major difference between mass and social media is that the former 
transmits messages through centralized broadcasting organizations meaning “from 
one to all” whereas the latter makes users independent from authorized production 
(Bariachello & Carvalho 2013:239). However, these analytical terms do not 
encompass the complexity of the communications field. Especially in the age of 
media convergence can one observe how mass media harnesses digital technology to 
increase its outreach and to ensure reciprocal communication with audience. In 
addition, one could state that mass media is social and vice versa. The terms are 
useful for building comparisons and evaluating a profound change in communication 
when a consumer might transform into a producer. Yet, we consider the limitations of 
the existent categories and the lack of clarity in separation and will gauge the 
intricacy of the studied field with all the following implications in the concluding 
remarks. 
3. Methods and methodology  
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3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes a methodological framework implemented for this 
study. The paper is based on a discourse analysis with a focus on one particular case. 
By discourse analysis we mean an  “interrelated set of texts, and the practices of their 
production, dissemination, and reception” (Parker 1992, cited in Phillips & Hardy 
2002:5). Deriving from a critical realism perspective, we aim to examine how 
discourse forms a social world therefore executing “a concrete, linguistic textual 
analysis of language use in social interaction” (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002:62). 
Language shapes one’s reality and by combining data from diverse sources one can 
critically assess its influence on the social world and processes that take place. Thus, 
an intrinsic case study was adopted due to its exploratory nature (eds Mills, Durepos 
& Wiebe 2010) since it is driven not by the willingness to prove already existing 
theories, but rather by the urge to examine the uniqueness of the case. However, the 
main goal is to see how this unique case relates to the global patterns and how it can 
be used for the study of social uprisings in the digital age worldwide.  
 
3.2 Research approach and design 
In this study triangulation is used to gain a detailed understanding of the role 
of social media and to explore “the richness and complexity of human behavior” 
(Cohen & Manion 2000: 254). A combination of qualitative and quantitative methods 
has been adopted to broaden the capacity of our research and to draw comparisons 
between various sources. The triangulation approach allows us to mix data and 
methods in order to present diverse facets of the problem and to study social media’s 
phenomenon by analyzing different standpoints (Olsen 2004). Therefore, in this 
intrinsic case study existing statistics, secondary literature, social media posts and 
self-conducted interviews are incorporated. Limitations of each of the indicated data 
sources will be further discussed.  
Statistics in this study have been derived from a number of sources. Two 
separate studies of Twitter usage during Euromaidan are analyzed in this paper. One 
was conducted by the NYU lab Social Media and Political Participation (SMaPP). A 
second one was carried by Katerena Kuksenok, a doctoral candidate at the University 
of Washington (Computer Science & Engineering). Another data source is the “only 
multiday survey of protest participants” (Onuch 2014) conducted by the research team 
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from Oxford University, which took place in Kyiv between 26 November 2013 and 
10 January 2014 as a part of the Ukrainian Protest Project. One more poll utilized is 
the final report by the DIF (Democratic Initiatives Fund), which contains three 
surveys from the various stages of the Euromaidan protests and their assessment.  
In terms of using secondary literature about the Ukrainian case, one must take 
into consideration that due to novelty of the case there is a limited amount of 
scholarship. Further comparisons and contrasts are derived from the existing literature 
on digital revolutions, social mobilization and impact of new technology on society.   
Since it is a study of the social media’s impact on the course of a revolution, it 
appears to be beneficial to use social media flow as an invaluable source of 
information about the revolution’s evolvement. By questioning importance of social 
media in the protests, one can support or contradict our arguments by analyzing web 
users’ generated data. A primary source of Facebook posts in this intrinsic case study 
is the book “Phantom Pain #maidan” published in 2014, which contains around 1,000 
posts made by 271 authors throughout the revolution.  
For further insights and clarifications about the existing data the interview 
method was employed. The interview method uncovers individual experiences in the 
protesters’ own words, which is helpful for the quality of research (Kvale 1996). It 
was chosen for this study to provide illustrations to the existing quantitative and 
qualitative data and to bring personal experiences into the debate about the role of 
social media.  
3.3 Data collection 
The initial study of the problem started with an analysis of existing literature 
in order to get an understanding of the intricacies of the problem. However, as was 
previously mentioned, the case’s novelty significantly limits research of the academic 
literature. Therefore, one has to employ more methods to obtain necessary data, but 
with considerations about its objectivity and validity. We can draw conclusions about 
the Ukrainian revolution and its various implications by referring to academic works 
by S. Leshchenko (2014), O. Lytsevych (2013), O. Onuch (2014), N. Diuk (2014), B. 
Etling (2014). Furthermore, there are articles published by researchers in online media 
(for instance, T. Bogdanova (2013), T. Lokot (2013), N. Kravets (2013) and D. 
Peleschuk (2013)).  Firstly, for this study sources in English language were chosen so 
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that non-Ukrainian and non-Russian speakers could validate information provided. 
Secondly, Ukrainian and Russian-language sources were used to supply information 
which was not transmitted to the global audience. Being a native Ukrainian and a 
fluent Russian speaker is an asset as it gives one a choice of data from sources for 
both the national and international audience. Yet caution must be applied as the 
findings might not be sufficient for interpretation. However, such limitations impel 
one to adopt a set of further methods to analyze and reflect on existing data, which 
can benefit the study. 
Selection of the statistics in this study was contingent on their availability. As 
stated above, due to the novelty of the case as well as to the specifics of our research 
field, a limited amount of statistical data exists. The primary goal of this study has 
been to use statistics gathered by renowned, trustworthy organizations. Therefore, a 
research conducted by the Oxford University Group as well as by the NYU SMaPP 
appears to meet such requirements. Polls conducted by the Ukrainian DIF provide 
comprehensive data about demographics, incentives and political claims of protesters 
as well as fluctuations throughout the period of revolution. Furthermore, the 
individual research of Katerena Kuksenok is valuable for drawing comparisons with 
the NYU lab findings. However, there are certain limitations and considerations that 
have to be taken into account when interpreting this data. These are the following: the 
mode of data collection and questionnaire design (Saris & Gallhofer 2007), sensitivity 
issues and knowledge of local culture by foreign researchers (eds Harkness & Braun 
2010) and “social desirability bias” as well as “response effects” (eds Groves & 
Kaftan 2002:155). Regarding the latter, one must take into consideration that 
respondents answer in the special circumstances of social unrest and their answers 
regarding motivations to participate and plans to continue to participate might have 
been affected by willingness to fulfill certain criteria and to present themselves “in a 
favorable light” (ibid). Moreover, data was accumulated in the place of collective 
action where respondents might have been willing to support this collectivism idea by 
their answers in order to maintain a good reputation (eds Harkness & Braun 2010). 
This motivation might have been also amplified by knowledge that foreign 
researchers will transmit obtained data abroad. In addition, the mode of data 
collection by the local think tank DIF was focused around civil society building and 
democracy establishment in Ukraine therefore limiting availability of data about the 
society’s support of the state. Moreover, one should take into consideration the human 
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factor, which impacts the way data is collected and interpreted. For instance, the fact 
that Ukrainian native Olga Onuch led the Oxford University research group might 
have significantly modified results affecting the objectivity and neutrality of the 
study. Social media assessment must also be considered due to its selectivity and the 
crudeness of the method as acknowledged by the researchers themselves (Kuksenok 
2014).  
Considering the selection of social media texts, the main criteria were their 
role in triggering the revolution (texts which are claimed to be the first ones) or their 
ability to exemplify arguments presented in this paper. The latter were chosen as 
illustrations of the processes that were taking place throughout the uprising. However, 
there is a potential for bias and a subjective interpretation as well as an exclusion of 
important data due to basing analysis on the Facebook posts published in “Phantom 
Pain #maidan”. Furthermore, one should not expect them to be of a higher 
significance than the others as they were selected not based on their impact online, but 
on their language that provides supportive evidence of the trends discussed in this 
study. 
The interviews designed for this study were conducted with an interview guide 
yet with the follow-up questions to open a space for the interviewee’s reflections on 
their experiences and to urge “spontaneous, rich, specific and relevant answers” 
(Kvale 1996:145). Two out of three initially planned interviews were accomplished. 
Both interviews were in Russian due to the respondents’ preference and the relevant 
passages were translated and incorporated into this study. Anastasiia Savytska, one of 
the two editors of “Phantom Pain #maidan” answered the questions over the phone on 
25 February 2015. This interview is titled Interview 1 in the study. An interview with 
the co-editor did not take place due to the lack of time of the interviewee. The second 
interview was conducted with a Ukrainian activist, Mykhailo Onipchenko, on 21 
March 2015 over the phone and is referred to as Interview 2 in this study. These 
respondents were selected for a number of reasons. First and foremost, it was 
important to ensure that respondents were not bystanders, but active participants in 
the protests themselves. Thus they could assist with the evaluation of online and 
offline activities. “Phantom Pain #maidan” is a distinctive book since it is the only 
attempt to build the timeline of the revolution by collecting Facebook posts in 
chronological order. Therefore, an interview with the editor gives insight into the 
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preparation for publication as well as provides remarks about the significance of 
social media as a tool and a catalyzer of social unrest. The second interviewee was 
chosen due to his dual protest activity in Ukraine and in Germany and his ability to 
draw comparisons of activism in his home country and amongst diaspora residing 
abroad. We must be aware though that the responses are subjective and are therefore 
liable to recall bias. Furthermore, in the course of the 7 stages of interview 
investigation researcher’s own interpretations on the stages 5-7 (analyzing, verifying, 
reporting) (Kvale 1996:88) and incorporating obtained data might significantly affect 
validity and reliability of the data.   
3.4 Methodology 
In order to study the patterns of social media usage in the Ukrainian 
revolution, triangulation of the intrinsic study was adopted. This is aimed at 
contributing to an existent discussion about the role of social media both on national 
and international levels. Thus the key question is the relevance of the case to the 
global studies field. Euromaidan might serve as an illustration of the global trends of 
social media usage, social mobilization and revolutions. In order to ensure relevance 
of the local case to the international field of studies, it is discussed in the spectrum of 
global communication and cooperation. The paper intends to exemplify global drivers 
of mass mobilization, the role of leadership and community building via social media 
with the Euromaidan revolution. Consequently, this study provides a nuanced 
discussion of the Ukrainian case yet with a purpose to contribute to the general debate 
about social media in the course of social uprisings.  
3.5 Research limitations 
In addition to the challenges stated above with regards to data collection and 
analysis, this research is also limited by geographical constraints. If repeated again, it 
would include fieldwork in the Ukrainian capital. Since data collection depended 
solely on technology (the Internet, phone), it might lack invaluable input, which could 
be found if personal interviews and surveys took place in Kyiv. 
One should also take into consideration that this is a time-constrained study of 
a social movement that is still ongoing. After February 2014 Ukrainians harnessed 
social media for coordination and cooperation in the course of the annexation of 
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Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine. Therefore, there are more tools and platforms 
that have emerged after Euromaidan which require thorough study. It is conducive, in 
particular, to the discussions about probability of the Euromaidan revolution’s 
repetition in Ukraine.  
4. Analysis 
4.1 Euromaidan: revolution in a digital era 
 
“It all began with a single Facebook post.” This is what renowned Ukrainian 
journalist Sergii Leshchenko writes about the start of the Ukrainian revolution 
(Leshchenko 2014:52).  Whether giving too much credence to social media or not, the 
fact remains clear that not every Facebook post would compel thousands of people 
out to the streets to express their discontent with the politicians in power. Discrepancy 
between people’s expectations and the government’s ability to meet those 
expectations can spur a revolution (Lohmann 1994). Essentially, president Viktor 
Yanukovych’s decision to suspend preparation for signing an Association Agreement 
with the EU announced on 21 November 2013 took the nation by surprise. Yet for the 
officials themselves the reaction of the Ukrainian population was surprising as well. 
T. Kuran calls such uprisings “revolutions out of nowhere” (cited in Onuch 2014:44). 
It is arguable to what extent one might estimate the given case as “out of nowhere” 
since the Association Agreement had been anticipated by the majority of the 
Ukrainian population. According to a DW-Trend poll (2013), 55% of Ukrainians 
wanted the Association Agreement with the EU to be signed in 2013.  39% believed 
that the future agreement would assist a general economic modernization whereas 
26% expected it to contribute to the improvement of the political situation thereby 
strengthening democracy in Ukraine.  Therefore, when one week before the highly 
anticipated Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius (28-29 November 2013) Mr. 
Yanukovych declared its suspension, it might have been considered a decision lapsing 
Ukraine’s “ticket to Europe” (Korrespondent.net 2013).  
The leader of the opposition party Batkivshchyna, Arseniy Yatsenuk, 
proclaimed it to be an “illegal and unconstitutional cessation of Ukraine’s European 
course” (Batkivshchyna 2013). He identified this decision as “high treason” and 
immediately called for the impeachment of Mr. Yanukovych as well as for the 
resignation of the Cabinet of Ministers.  
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Yet even for opposition leaders, society’s response to the governmental 
decision was unforeseen. Massive rallies “caught Ukraine’s political opposition 
unprepared” (Olearchyk & Buckley 2013). According to one of the protest organizers, 
there were two possible evolutions of this uprising: to dissolve after the first protest 
and later on come in larger numbers, or to stay on the streets and demand 
parliamentary and presidential elections “in theory toppling […] the regime” (ibid). In 
another interview Serhiy Melnichenko, one of the political activists, said it was 
remarkable that people organized themselves “within several hours without any calls 
from opposition leaders” (Peleschuk 2013). There was no particular political party’s 
incentive at the core of the protest and, moreover, the organizers didn’t seek guidance 
from the opposition leaders. Eventually, the latter had to follow protesters “catching 
up”, if they wanted to put themselves at the head of the movement (Diuk 2014). 
A number of experts and journalists refer to the Euromaidan revolution as 
something not only unexpected, but also novel in terms of communication and 
coordination. Its spontaneity, rapid and efficient self-organization as well as 
volunteerism and spirit of sharing that followed are described as the unique features 
of the Maidan (Diuk 2014:88).  
It is pivotal to analyze the role of leadership in the Euromaidan protests. As 
was mentioned earlier, the opposition leaders were not the ones who catalyzed crowds 
and made them go out and protest. Some would argue that it was Mustafa Nayem, a 
well-known Ukrainian journalist, who initiated the protests by posting an open call to 
action on Facebook (Kravets 2013; Leshchenko 2014). His Facebook post, released 
after the governmental announcement, urged crowds to go to Independence Square 
(Maidan), 
 
“Okay, let’s be serious. Who is ready to go out to Maidan today before midnight? 
Likes are not counted. Only comments under this post with “I’m ready.” As soon as 
we have over 1000, let’s self-organize.” (Facebook page 21 November 2013). 
 
One hour later the number of comments reached 600 and those writing, “I’m ready” 
numbered over 1,000. M. Nayem followed with a short post saying,  
 
“We meet near the Independence monument at 22.30. Wear warm clothes, bring 
umbrellas, tea, coffee, good mood and your friends. A repost is encouraged.” 
(Facebook page 21 November 2013). 
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His post got over 1,000 shares in a few hours (Kapliuk 2013) and the crowd of 
50 grew to over 1,000 people (Diuk 2014). According to KyivPost (the English-
language newspaper in Kyiv), the number increased to 3,000 Kyivans who gathered at 
Independence Square late at night and stayed until morning (Kapliuk 2013). 
Reflecting back on the start of the social movement, M. Nayem argues that his initial 
call was not for a revolution, but for a protest. He aimed it at people who monitor his 
Facebook page: friends and colleagues (DW 2014). When asked whether he 
condemns himself for pulling the country into revolution, M. Nayem answers that he 
was not “the only one” and the protest was “a protest of a new generation” (ibid). One 
could also argue that it is not necessarily a new generation, but a more critical society 
that “has gone through an evolution”, as argued by activist M. Onipchenko (Interview 
2). 
It appears to be a simplified version of unfolding events when connecting 
Euromaidan solely to M. Nayem and his post on Facebook. Effectiveness of 
collective action does not necessarily depend on organized leadership as individuals 
can “coordinate their participation decisions spontaneously” (Lohmann 1994:89). 
However, M. Onipchenko argues that such people serve as “matches” creating a solid 
ground for a protest to spark as they might have access to information that the 
population does not have (Interview 2). This refers to S. Lohmann’s idea of “senders” 
and “receivers” (1994), as the key opinion leaders are those that have access to 
information which is concealed from the majority of the population. While the 
information is being revealed, the population can further intensify its impact on the 
change of a malignant regime. When elaborating on the importance of the leaders, or 
“senders”, M. Onipchenko says,  
 
“There should be a combination of leadership and cooperation. I believe that when 
the society matures, it bears a leader by itself. Mustafa is one of those, thanks to 
circumstances he became a symbol of this revolution” (Interview 2). 
 
“Phantom Pain #maidan” doesn’t include M. Nayem’s post. Anastasiia 
Savytska, the volume’s editor, clarifies why it is not in the book saying that the post 
“was not decisive” for her, or for her closest friends who protested during 
Euromaidan. She spent all 3 months of the revolution actively participating in the 
Maidan’s activities, but it was not his call that made her and her colleagues to go out 
to Independence Square. She does not consider him to be an opinion leader.  
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“It is all about solidarity and cooperation, not about leadership. It was not Mustafa 
who made the revolution possible. When I first arrived, there were a few hundreds of 
students and everything appeared to be quite pathetic. I didn’t believe it would have 
any success.” (Interview 1). 
 
Yet, for A. Savytska a turning point was the unprecedented violence of the 
state’s police when protesters were beaten up during the night of 29-30 November 
2013 (eight days after the start of the protest). BERKUT special police units attacked 
400 peaceful protesters during the night using smoke-puff charges, beating them with 
batons and trampling them down with their feet (Euromaidan SOS 2013).  
 
“I saw those reports. I saw blood on the pavement. It impressed me very much. I was 
horrified. Friends asked me to join them for the protest. I was reluctant, I must admit. 
But I had Facebook in front of my eyes all the time.  And then somebody asked to 
bring tea and cups for protesters who were hiding from police in the church. It was 
my open call to come and help,” says A. Savytska about her motivation to join the 
revolutionary movement (Interview 1).  
“Saturday’s savage crackdown had emotions running high”, reported The 
Independent about that turning point of the revolution (Tucker 2013). In the 
interviews respondents confirm that it was the unforeseen police outrage that made 
them join the rallies. Throughout the revolution violence became ubiquitous. 
Reflecting on the exceptional violence, K. Kruk, a civil activist and a political 
scientist, wrote that “Ukrainians won’t calm down” as long as there is a danger of 
“lapsing back into dictatorship” (2014).   
As the Euromaidan revolution unfolded, one could draw links with the 
Ukrainian Orange Revolution of 2004. Motivation, tools, participating parties and 
consequences vary. Thus, comparing both revolutions appears to result in finding 
more differences than similarities. As explained before, none of the political parties 
triggered the Euromaidan, whereas opposition leaders’ disagreement on the election 
results led to the Orange Revolution. Moreover, the fact that political parties hassled 
themselves to join the crowds during the revolution in 2013 “deterred many 
Ukrainians from joining the protests” (Bigg 2013). Hence, the Euromaidan could not 
be a second Orange Revolution as the protests were not top-down, but "horizontal" 
and “truly social” (Karpyak 2013). The idea was not only to express disagreement 
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with the political power of that time, but also to go further and to build new 
“alternative civic and social structures to act upon” (Diuk 2014:88). Consequently, the 
Euromaidan and its self-organization proved to be an example of establishing trust 
and cooperation amongst Ukrainians.  
Symbolically, both revolutions started on the same day, 21 November, with a 
time difference of 9 years. M. Nayem stated that this coincidence incited him to call 
people to “just meet” at Independence Square to express discontent with the 
government’s decision, but also to celebrate the Orange Revolution’s anniversary 
(DW 2014). The date is one of a few identical characteristics of both revolutions. A 
pivotal feature of the Orange Revolution was the well-organized structure of the fully 
prepared activist groups.  Nearly 2,000 activists had been trained a few months 
beforehand to organize a mass protest in case of falsifications during the elections 
(Pishchikova & Ogryzko 2014). In comparison the Euromaidan appears to be driven 
by the masses themselves through usage of social media, neighborhood initiatives and 
online news sources rather than any calls from the opposition leaders (Olearchyk & 
Buckley 2013; Onuch 2014).  
If it was social media that galvanized the Euromaidan, back in 2004 it was 
mobile connection that played a main communicative role. SMS messages were used 
for coordination, logistics and avoiding police cordons thus forming vast networks 
with little hierarchy, “smart mobs” (Diamond 2012; Hirst 2013).  Yet texting “sets the 
question of social revolution aside” due to its limitations in editing and elaboration 
(Rafael, cited in Castells, Fernandez-Ardevol & Qiu 2006:192). The scholars argue 
that other media channels have to be involved for “a civic deliberation” (ibid). 
Dissemination of information via SMS messages versus social media in two 
revolutions showcases how efficiency, speed and scale of communication have been 
reconsidered by the Ukrainian population. Moreover, there is also a debate whether it 
is not only more efficient, but also safer to share information via social media rather 
than mobile text messages. This feature will be further discussed in the frame of 
existent risks and dangers of using various communication tools.   
The Euromaidan is not a second Orange Revolution for one more reason: the 
violence that escalated into a brutal crackdown of the peaceful protests in 2013. The 
Orange Revolution happened to be a celebration of the power of democracy and 
freedom of speech, described by Steven Pifer (a senior advisor, Russia and Eurasia 
Program; former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine) as “a phenomenon” since Ukrainians 
achieved their goals peacefully (Kosc-Harmatiy 2007). Yet, in 2013 incumbents took 
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a contrasting approach and used special police forces for suppression. M. Onipchenko 
draws the following comparisons, 
 
“Unlike the Orange Revolution, Euromaidan was not about singing songs and 
showing off with orange scarfs. It was a fight. It was not enough just to come – one 
had to be ready to fight, to watch and take care of injured so that they would not be 
grabbed by police and arrested.” (Interview 2). 
 
Not only young students were severely beaten, but national and international 
media representatives as well, which was an “unprecedented attack upon civil society 
in the history of Ukraine” (Kravets 2013). In this case social media played a role 
when images and videos of brutality and violence were disseminated on Youtube and 
other channels in order to trigger an international policy response (ibid; Weidmann 
2015). It is especially important to understand that visuals are “the currency of social 
media” and they might be powerful enough to make a receiver “feel the urge” to take 
action (Watson 2014). 
The Euromaidan is described as a brand-new chapter in the history of 
Ukrainian uprisings. It was not a repetition of the Orange Revolution from the very 
beginning, mainly because of the absence of any political party’s driver behind it. 
Also, its spontaneity was unforeseen due to the nation’s  “protest fatigue” (Hirst 
2013), caused by dissatisfaction and disappointment in the Orange Revolution’s 
consequences. Nevertheless, the rapid growth in the numbers of protesters proves that 
protest fatigue evaporated due to the unpredictable decisions and actions of the state 
power. One could argue that this was a clash of protest fatigue with an outcry for 
democracy and freedom where the latter proved to lead the crowds. As M. 
Granovetter states, individual participation depends heavily on the number of people 
involved in the protest (1978). During the Euromaidan rallies both political and civic 
actors had a “mind-altering” (Diuk 2014) experience of being exposed to the crowds 
that were willing to lead the movement by themselves, empowered by their own 
numbers.  
 
4.2 Social media at the core of the revolution 
 
In contrast to the experiences of the Orange Revolution, it is indeed 
noteworthy how much the importance of social media has increased in Ukraine. 
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Furthermore, information sharing did not only change throughout the last 9 years in 
the country, but has also developed throughout the Euromaidan revolution itself. 
When analyzing what types of social media were the most popular during the protests, 
one should look at the statistics of the general web users’ interests. The latest report 
released by the Internet Association of Ukraine and conducted by the Factum Group 
Ukraine shows which websites are the most popular among Ukrainians by counting 
the daily and monthly average of usage. A monthly coverage stands for a number of 
people that visit a certain website at least once per month. Yet for online activism, one 
could assume a daily engagement is more explanatory. According to this report, the 
Russian social media platforms Vkontakte (“Russian Facebook”) and Odnoklassniki 
are the leaders with 46% and 27% of monthly coverage respectively. Facebook has 
12% whereas Twitter has only 4% (Dmytrenko 2015). Yet in terms of online activism 
and mobilization during the uprisings, the pattern was different. In a study conducted 
by social media researcher K. Kuksenok, Facebook was leveraged for analytical 
content as it is a “more serious space” than Vkontakte (Kuksenok 2014). A. Savytska 
comments on the trend, saying, 
 
“Odnoklassniki does not have a sufficient information flow due to the different 
interface and web structure. It is not tailored to spread information. As for Vkontakte, 
its target audience is youth. And it appears that those who visit it are there more for 
downloading music and films free of charge than anything else” (Interview 1). 
 
The first calls for action emerged neither on Odnoklassniki nor on Vkontakte. 
It was Facebook that Ukrainian journalist and activist M. Nayem used to call on his 
followers. It was on Twitter where the hashtag #євромайдан (“Euromaidan” – 
“European Square”) was coined. The author remains anonymous, yet it was picked up 
by thousands of people so rapidly as if it “sprung from the collective unconscious” 
(AP 2013). The first tweet, which appeared online early Thursday, 21 November 
2013, with the hashtag #euromaidan, was immediately adopted and retweeted over 
20,000 times in 20 hours (Hirst 2013).  
The role of Facebook in the course of the Ukrainian revolution can be 
examined by studying “Phantom Pain #maidan”. A. Savytska collected and edited 
materials for 4 months. It took an extra month to reduce the amount of posts to show 
the timeline of the Ukrainian revolution. Apart from individual posts that generated 
discussions, likes and shares, there were also Facebook pages promptly created. The 
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official Euromaidan Facebook page accumulated nearly 80,000 likes in the first eight 
days of its existence thus setting a record (Bogdanova 2013). The page became the 
most “talked about” with 110,000 instances of sharing, liking and commenting; it is 
also the fastest growing page within Ukrainian social networks that reached over 
100,000 subscribers in the first three weeks (Kapliuk 2013). The page provided the 
community with essential information about accommodation, transportation, and the 
needs of protesters; recommendations on safety as well as promotional materials 
about the Euromaidan. There were specific groups such as Доїхати на Майдан (“Get 
to the Maidan”) wherein car owners provided their contact information so that 
protesters could get a ride to and from the protest location. Also, a number of online 
groups and websites for legal advice (Euromaidan SOS; Eurozahyst.org; The 
Revolution’s Legal Department) as well as for medical care (Maidan.Doctors, The 
Organization of volunteers medics) emerged (Bogdanova 2013).  
Facebook and Twitter, both being the leading means of communication during 
the Euromaidan, served different goals though. According to J. A. Tucker, Facebook 
posts were meant to assist in organization and facilitation of the protests and to 
increase social pressure (Tucker 2014). Because the Euromaidan Facebook page was 
launched in Ukrainian, one might infer that it was registered for assisting protesters in 
coordination and logistics, not for diffusing information to the international audience. 
Yet, the twin-page in English was launched shortly thereafter as well along with 
regional pages to coordinate protests locally. 
Twitter was used mainly for providing news in a real time and informing the 
international audience about the conflict’s evolvement (ibid). For this purpose, the 
initiative Digitalmaidan was launched to target “a focused list of major journalists, 
politicians, and other individuals across the globe” (Digitalmaidan 2014). The website 
has clear instructions on how to register a Twitter account and provides a list of pre-
made tweets as well as guidelines on when (10 a.m. EST) and how to tweet so that the 
viral effect of a “Twitter storm” can occur. 26 pre-made tweets are in Ukrainian, 
Russian and English and are focused mainly on the image of the former Ukrainian 
president giving information about his links to the Kremlin; his lavish acquisitions; 
plagiarism of his book and the violation of human rights during the protests. 
Considering that the home page of the campaign is in English and its target audience 
is “across the globe”, one might infer that tweets were predominantly meant to be in 
English. A few tweets are targeted specifically at Europe, Canada, USA and South 
America. Here are some examples of the pre-made tweets: 
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“Yankovych, do you jail any murderers or only the unpaid ones? 7 protestors killed 
so far!! #digitalmaidan #euromaidan #ukraine” 
“Ukrainians fear kidnapping, beatings, and death in the fight for basic human rights. 
http://bit.ly/L0FDPj #euromaidan #digitalmaidan” 
 “South America supports basic human rights in #Ukraine. #euromaidan 
#digitalmaidan” 
The Social Media and Political Participation Lab (SMaPP) at New York 
University (NYU) conducted research analyzing popularity of Facebook and Twitter 
beginning from 25 November 2013. According to their findings, Twitter usage was 
lower than Facebook’s activity, with a total of 120,000 tweets sent with the hashtag of 
#euromaidan in the first 10 days of the uprising (Barbera & Metzger 2013). However, 
it is worth noting that due to the information flow on Twitter, more and more people 
were motivated to create Twitter accounts. Hence, we can see “a two-way effect” 
(Tucker 2014). One way is to use social media to gather people and mobilize them for 
an offline activity. Yet, an offline activity itself and news about its sequences spur an 
interest in social media and multiply the social media engagement of protesters. 
Demonstrators therefore cause online activity and it resonates in such a way that more 
non-users are driven to social media in order to participate in online communication.  
There is clear proof of J. A. Tucker’s elaboration on the two-way effect as the 
numbers of Facebook and Twitter users amplified during the Ukrainian revolution. At 
the height of the protests around 230,000 new users joined Facebook (MediaBusiness 
2014). Before November 2013 there had been 6-7,000 new Twitter accounts 
registered in Ukraine monthly. But in December 2013 this number grew to 16,000 
with a follow-up of nearly 55,000 accounts in January 2014 (Gorovyi 2014). A. 
Savytska explains such exponential growth saying that her friends and colleagues 
registered Twitter accounts exclusively for obtaining information about ongoing 
protests (Interview 1). In fact, 1,200 of 34,000 Twitter users posting about the protests 
joined Twitter since the start of the Euromaidan (Barbera & Metzger 2013). In 
December 2013 the number of Ukrainians visiting Twitter on a monthly basis 
increased in 21% (2.5 million) with 500,000 Ukrainians using Twitter daily 
(Minchenko 2014). 
In terms of the language of communication, we can see that Twitter was 
perceived as a tool to reach out to the international audience and share the latest 
updates about the situation in Ukraine. According to the SMaPP research, almost 70% 
of users tweeted about the revolution from Ukraine, yet many of them wrote in 
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English (2013).  K. Kuksenok, a social media scholar, supports this argument with her 
research that shows a vast majority of tweets (80%) posted in English “to translate 
maidan-related activity to the West” (2013). Remarkably enough, in this study of the 
millions of tweets with various hashtags, K. Kuksenok observes a phenomenon of 
tweets in Ukrainian prevailing over the Russian ones especially during the most 
violent clashes. Thus one could raise a question of an intensified national identity 
building since protesters “suddenly spoke more Ukrainian than Russian” (ibid).  
As the revolution evolved with human rights violations and police assaults, a 
dramatic shift in social media usage could be also seen. According to T. Lokot, a 
researcher and a PhD student at Merrill College of Journalism, University of 
Maryland, the initially high number of hashtags dropped throughout the course of the 
revolution. This makes research about Twitter activity much more complicated. As 
events “unfold unpredictably”, protesters dropped hashtags to save time and space 
and such a trend meant losing a large amount of information that could be used to 
make valid conclusions (Lokot 2013). Researchers at SMaPP concluded that Twitter 
usage reached its peak during the violent assault of the special police units on 10-11 
December 2013 (Metzger 2013) when 11,000 police and National Guard troops took 
down barricades and arrested protesters along the way to Independence Square 
(KyivPost 2013). Social media activity on Twitter with #euromaidan reached 2,500 
tweets per hour when police started to dismantle the protesters’ camp (Metzger 2013). 
Counting the percentage of tweets in English and Ukrainian, SMaPP findings also 
suggest that since 10 December the role of Twitter has shifted from reaching out to 
the international community to informing protesters themselves about attacks as one 
could see “a much stronger spike in Ukrainian language activity” (ibid). 
Nevertheless, comparing numbers of the Euromaidan theme-related tweets in 
the beginning of the Euromaidan and during its evolvement, we can see the general 
decline in its popularity as it dropped almost twofold. 4,800 tweets were posted on 30 
November 2013 (Lokot 2013). During the violent assault in December 2013 SMaPP 
calculated that around 2,500 tweets with the hashtag #euromaidan were posted per 
hour (Metzger 2013). However, as previously mentioned, this does not include tweets 
without hashtags or tweets with other less popular hashtags.  
In consideration of the two-way effect (Tucker 2014), we have already 
explained how the need to be informed attracted more Ukrainians to register their 
Twitter accounts. However, and this is a remarkable trend, although Internet users 
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were initially driven to Twitter, it does not necessarily mean that they continued using 
it. A.  Savytska states,  
“Many friends of mine started using Twitter to obtain some information about the 
protests. And when the main events had occured, Twitter also lost its importance for 
many of my acquaintances. There was no need for such an information flow 
anymore” (Interview 1). 
This supports the report released by the Internet Association of Ukraine about 
the most popular websites and an argument about Twitter’s “small corner of relevant 
social media landscape” (Kuksenok 2014).  On the contrary, one year after the 
Euromaidan events, a Twitter account Майдан День за Днем (“Maidan Day by 
Day”) was created. It allows Twitter users to recollect their memories of the 
revolution by sharing their news stories, impressions and visuals. While this paper is 
being written, the Twitter page has collected 459 tweets and 6,589 followers. This 
number is not significantly high in comparison to the Twitter activity in the end of 
2013- beginning of 2014; however, it suggests that the information flow does 
continue after the revolution. “The collective memory game” is meant to revive 
history by engaging Ukrainians in a “crowdsourced living history experiment” when 
sharing links, posts, photos with the hashtag #maidandaybyday (Lokot 2014). In 
addition, one might suggest that Twitter activity shifted due to developments with the 
Crimea annexation, separatist movements and terrorist attacks.   
Furthermore, we must take into consideration that apart from the widely 
known social media platforms leveraged throughout revolutions worldwide, a number 
of Ukrainian channels emerged during the Euromaidan. Therefore, quantitative and 
qualitative research of “the most used” might not provide clear results as online 
audiences diffuse according to their preferences in content sharing and manner of 
communication. The website galas.org.ua (which is now available only as a Facebook 
page) provided maps of protests and served as a platform to share information about 
the need for help, missing people, centers of medical assistance as well as free WIFI 
spots. A similar website, maidanhelp.org, monitored all social media and published 
volunteer vacancies on its platform as well as requests from doctors, lawyers and 
journalists thus playing the role of a news aggregator (Maidanhelp.org 2013). In 
addition, there were two websites (maidansupport.com; maydanneeds.com) with the 
“maps of needs” of the Maidan headquarters and smaller volunteer centers (ibid). All 
websites have suspended their activity since the end of the revolution. On 
Maidanhelp.org, a web visitor can see a short message that for the time being the 
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website had been reviewed almost 2.5 million times (not counting the Facebook page) 
and the “editorial team consisted of over 70 people who “often didn’t know each 
other and have never met” (ibid). Another aggregator, helpeuromaidan.info, still 
functions, but with  a new goal – to provide information about the needs of soldiers 
and people affected by conflicts in eastern Ukraine and Crimea. From this discussion 
on social media platforms we would suggest shifting to characteristics of the society 
that actually utilized or did not utilize them. 
 
4.3 A phenomenon of Maidanocracy 
 
Who were the people going out into the streets? It is a pivotal question when 
we hold a debate about so called “Twitter” or “Millennial” revolutions. We could 
presume that the protesters were social media savvy young people. As suggested by 
the Ukrainian historian Y. Hrytsak, Euromaidan was the revolution of people born 
after Ukraine declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. “It’s the 
revolution of young people who are very educated, people who are active in social 
media, who are mobile” (Mayshev 2014). However, a different pattern was observed 
by the researchers from Oxford University, who held a number of surveys (26 
November 2013 -10 January 2014) identifying protesters’ age, occupation and 
motivation to take part in the protests. According to their findings, almost 70% of 
protesters were older than 30 years old, a quarter of participants were older than 55  
(Onuch 2014). These findings can be further confirmed by polls commissioned in 
three stages by the DIF (Democratic Initiatives Fund) that monitored changes of a 
representative sample throughout the Maidan-protest, the Maidan-camp and the 
Maidan-Sich (“Sich” refers to the Ukrainian Cossack camp). At the last stage of the 
revolution, the number of participants with higher education remained steadily high 
(43.1%) whereas the number of students had decreased (from 10% to 6%) (DIF 
2014). Almost 60% of protesters were specialists, entrepreneurs, and managers 
(Paniotto 2014).  
However, students played a major role in galvanizing the first stage (the 
Maidan-protest, as defined by the DIF). Oxford University research showed that the 
“early joiners” and “stalwarts” were undergraduates, journalists and “self-identified 
members of civic organizations” (Onuch 2014). A statement that it was a youth-led 
movement similar to Occupy (Kravets 2013; Mayshev 2014) is thus viable. Yet, it 
should also be considered that “early joiners” did not necessarily stay on the Maidan 
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throughout the revolution as the numbers indicate. The percentage of youth, activists 
and experienced protesters dropped as soon as protesters’ demands shifted from 
foreign policy claims to human and civic rights (Onuch 2014). It leads us to 
reflections about the importance of studying the role of youth as a catalyzer of the 
social movement versus a sustainer of the Euromaidan revolution.   
The sole fact of suspending preparation to take the EU course did not 
empower hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians to protest. Yet, a trigger of a mass 
protest was a severe crackdown of the Maidan on the night of 30 November 2013, 
which shocked and horrified millions of Ukrainians. Pictures and videos shared via 
social media and broadcast on mass media played an outstanding role in mobilizing 
the crowds. Almost 70% of protesters interviewed by the DIF stated that they joined 
the protests because of cruel reactions of authorities against unrest participants (DIF 
2014). Shocking pictures and footage also helped Ukrainians to identify where 
exactly protests and clashes took place. Contrary to widespread conviction that social 
media was the main communication tool, 48.9% of protesters said they found out 
when and where to go to participate in the protests from television (Onuch 2014). In 
the meantime, A. Savytska states that Facebook worked as a much more motivational 
tool than mass media, 
“Firstly, everything was way too scary on TV –  burning and exploding. It looked like 
an apocalypse. Secondly, TV didn’t ask for help whereas Facebook did. There was an 
activity on Facebook where made one see that bread, medication etc. are needed – it 
motivated for action” (Interview 1). 
 According to A. Granovetter, there should be a threshold of “safety”, which 
would allow individuals to join the protest. In other words, the more protesters are 
already in the street, the higher the chance that an individual will be willing to join as 
the “cost of joining” declines (1978:1442).  We could think about it in terms of T. 
Kuran’s preference falsification theory (1989) as well as political cascades, which are 
observed by the crowds (Fischer 2013). As day-by-day people watch the 
amplification of the protest, they are more likely to change their preferences, join  
“the revolutionary bandwagon” and express dissatisfaction with the government 
without fear of standing out (Kuran 1989:47). Yet, the puzzle of the Ukrainian case is 
that a threshold of safety was perceived in a unique way since Ukrainians joined “in 
the risky business of protest when it became more dangerous to do so” (Onuch 
2014:50). Violence and police brutality as well as threats of arrest did not discourage 
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Ukrainians, but conversely drew them to the Maidan, which, paradoxically, appeared 
to be “the safest place”. Even if hypothetically there were repressions enforced for all 
of the participants of the Euromaidan, only around 6% of all surveyed said they would 
leave the Maidan (DIF 2014).  
 “We went to the Maidan not because of some pleas. We went to people and for 
people. It was the only place, where we could feel ourselves safe,” says A. Savytska 
(Interview 1).  
 
This argument does confirm A. Granovetter’s idea that the number of 
participants is a decisive factor for new joiners to take part in a protest (1978). It 
appears that building this “safe haven” in the center of a revolution requires a strong 
civil society. This is fertile ground for public discontent to take roots (Habermas 
1991).  Public sphere is a paramount communicative space which gives realization to 
social accountability through demands from leaders and elected officials (World 
Bank, cited in Wildermuth 2014:8).  
However, the strength of Ukrainian civil society remains a doubtful question. 
The Ukrainian population stood its ground during the Orange Revolution, which is 
titled “the revolution of civil society” (Bilan & Bilan 2011:79). However, the same 
authors state that the level of Ukrainian political participation has been low and it did 
not significantly change after the Orange Revolution (ibid). According to Chatnam 
House research, Ukraine failed to transform the Orange Revolution’s “collective 
energy […] into organized, moderate, citizen power” (Lytsevych 2013:3). 
Furthermore, when hopes for political and social change with a new government were 
not fulfilled in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, no protest took place and the 
influence of civil society declined fleetingly (D’Anieri 2010).  
Disillusionment and protest fatigue (Hirst 2013) can be perceived as the 
Orange Revolution’s consequences, yet at the same time they are indicators of a weak 
civil society. A pro-democratic regime change must follow, but not forego the 
establishment of the public sphere (Shirky 2011). L. Way outlines three dimensions of 
civil society: a “traffic cop”; a “dispatcher and a mobilizer”; and “institutionalization 
with stability” (2014). We can conclude that civil society organizations and activist 
groups were less prominent in drawing crowds to the streets during the Euromaidan 
protests than back in 2004 (Olearchuk & Buckley 2013). Although the “veterans of 
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protests” provided leadership and guidance during the Euromaidan revolution, civil 
society groups were weak in their roles as dispatchers and mobilizers (Way 2014:38). 
This argument is supported by the findings of O. Onuch’s research team in Ukraine as 
well as the DIF polls. Only 2.2% of protesters joined because of an email from a civil 
organization; nearly twice as many were motivated by a Facebook invite from a civil 
organization (Onuch 2014). Over 90% of the Euromaidan participants did not belong 
to any party (DIF 2014). Still, regardless of the weak influence of civil society, the 
protests took place on a full scale. The Euromaidan’s example of self-empowerment 
illustrates that a strong civil society is not a prerequisite for a well-organized protest 
(Way 2014). 
One could see that the strength of civil society was growing while the 
Euromaidan protests were unfolding. The crowds were reluctant to rely on the 
opposition leaders in deciding the course of the country. The Maidan had its own 
demands, which were announced for the first time by a Ukrainian singer, an activist 
and winner of Eurovision 2004, Ruslana Lyzhychko. Maidan activists offered to form 
the Euromaidan Coordination Council in order to establish a dialogue between 
Ukrainian civil society and the European community. Furthermore, it demanded a 
resignation of the president as well as a cessation of repressions against the activists 
of the Euromaidan (Barkar 2013). Moreover, there was a petition that could be signed 
online, Zavdannya 5/12, addressed exclusively to opposition leaders (Task5/12 2013): 
“This Maidan is not the same as it was in 2004. We grew up. We don’t need messiahs. 
[…] We are vastly dissatisfied with your actions, especially, with your unconsolidated 
efforts and the absence of a well-defined reforms program.” 
The petition collected 7,728 signatures. Further, a self-formulated Civil 
Coordination council proclaimed its manifest and initiated negotiations between 
representatives of authorities, opposition and civil society with the participation of 
international observers (Karpinska 2013). Hence, we can see the emergence of active 
citizens who did not only protest, but also produced their own action plans and 
petitions both online and offline. The new term, “Maidanocracy”, was coined to 
showcase how the revolution gave rise to civil activism and political participation 
(Pishchikova & Ogryzko 2014:5). The Maidan itself became a tool to make 
changemakers meet, discuss and demand certain transformations from the parliament.  
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Through the newly built platform, Reanimation Reform Package (platforma-
reform.org), activists could consolidate their efforts and cooperate on offering new 
laws. The initiative was born from the Euromaidan out of the fear “to repeat the fate 
of the Orange Revolution” when the Ukrainian population delegated all power to 
reform the country to the president (Sokolenko 2014). Therefore, one more significant 
difference can be derived from this: even though the Orange Revolution is called a 
civil society revolution, an eminent change in the formation of civil society occurred 
throughout months of the Euromaidan social discontent. Furthermore, a volunteer 
movement for “cleansing state authorities”, the Civil Lustration Committee, was 
formed to remove corrupt politicians and to enhance transparency in the authority 
ranks (Pishchikova & Ogryzko 2014). Additionally, the Public Commission on the 
investigation and prevention of human rights violation in Ukraine was established 
(official website 2014). All of these platforms are active online and encourage for 
cooperation and active participation from Ukrainians that can now, due to digital 
tools, offer their ideas, pleas and views on reforms. 
Writing laws together and proclaiming the Maidan’s demands shows that 
concerns about the strength of Ukrainian civil society can be revisited after the 
Euromaidan protests. If during the Orange Revolution the goal of Ukrainian protesters 
had been to bring a particular political figure into power, nine years later it 
dramatically changed into striving for the creation of a new self-sustained society. As 
social media is conducive to framing a protest activity (Aday et. al 2010), Ukrainians 
appear to have enhanced their political participation making it “a self-proclaimed 
prophecy” (Gamson & Meyer, cited in Benford & Snow 2000: 631). Furthermore, a 
lack of reliance on mass media brought into being such media platforms as Spilno 
TV, Espresso TV and Hromadske TV where activists could post their content and 
share opinions. These are self-made projects that drove crowds from passive 
consumers to producers of information. The “networked public sphere” gives 
everybody a chance to speak up without the need to have any connection to a media 
institution (Benkler 2006:11). This also leads us to considerations about the absence 
of digital hierarchies that bring individuals together and lead to the formation of 
“networked horizontalism” (Hill 2013:42). As the media professionals cannot be “the 
sole custodians of source information” (Sasaki, cited in Wildermuth 2014:9), this task 
can be taken over by the crowds who produce information collectively on social 
media platforms.  
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Attempts to pass self-written laws, generate news and control state authorities 
as well as opposition leaders can be perceived as a new phase in building civil society 
in Ukraine. This appears to be a basis for the next generation of political leaders as 
well as the first structure since the proclaimed 1991 independence that bridged an 
interest gap between political leaders and the public (Diuk 2014).  
Not every civil society is good for democracy as argued by L. Way with 
examples of former Soviet republics (2014). Weakness and lack of mobilization 
hinder democratization and might potentially bring another cohort of autocrats into 
power. In fact, Ukrainian weak society with its “cynical public” hinders a democratic 
transition of the country (Price 2002:194). However, the case of the Ukrainian 
Euromaidan and its utilization of social media shows that civil society has awoken 
and has become more alert about threats of a reshaped autocracy. These have 
“reconfigurated boundaries of the Ukrainian civil society” making people feel 
responsible for the future of their country (Pishchikova & Ogryzko 2014:10). Yet we 
have to further discuss if technological advancement makes voices heard and results 
in offline development of the state in regard to the needs and wishes of civil society.  
4.4 Social media as a megaphone for activists 
Democracy and human rights protection can be executed via social media. 
That is what supporters of technology claim; yet it remains “controversial” (Garrett 
2006: 207). The interconnectivity itself is a valuable asset of a wired world, which is 
meant to be a solid basis for enhanced democracy, peace and a prolific public sphere 
as well as for strengthening national identity (Benkler 2006; Best & Wade 2009; 
Groshek 2009; Price 2002; Steela & Stein 2002). Conversely, E. Morozov states that 
social media’s interconnectedness is its chief weakness (2009). As stated by President 
of Radio Free Europe J. Gedmin, “democracy is not just a tweet away” (cited in 
Morozov 2012:38). For instance, social unrest had taken place with the help of self-
published opposition publications (samizdat) before the arrival of digital technology, 
during the Solidarity Movement in Poland in the 1980s (Kuksenok 2014). H. Clinton 
compared social media to samizdat in her renowned speech about the Internet 
freedom (Clinton 2010). Nonetheless, protests happened in the pre-Internet era for 
centuries, thus technology cannot be taken as the sole means for a revolution to occur 
(Garrett 2006; Hill 2013; Steela & Stein 2002). 
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 As argued by F. Fischer, there is a small amount of data confirming the 
supreme role of social media in overthrowing regimes (2013). The case of the 
Euromaidan could be touted as another Twitter revolution, however, as a study in 152 
countries indicates, the Internet is a “coincidental development condition” of 
democracy building (Groshek 2010:159). Since web users have a limited capacity to 
absorb information, being exposed to a larger amount of news does not lead to a 
higher political participation (Bimber 2001, cited in Garrett 2006:208). Moreover, 
Internet diffusion might hamper democracy by preventing society from political 
activity (Best & Wade 2006; 2009; Aday et al. 2010). 
Linking collective action to the widespread popularity of digital technology 
and social media takes us back to the considerations of the evolvement of information 
cascades (Lohmann 1994). Success of 1989 demonstrations in East Germany 
depended not on leadership and well-centered organization, but on spontaneity of 
mass protests. Moreover, newly created critical media enhanced public outrage by 
revealing the pitfalls and misconduct of the regime (ibid). The incumbents failed to 
respond to the information cascade thus allowing it to escalate with non-participants 
joining the initial group of activists (Shirky 2009). A similar trend, yet on a different 
scale, can be observed with the arrival of social media. It is both a tool for mass 
mobilization as well as for revealing information which in other circumstances would 
stay concealed. Furthermore, it is more complicated to use media for mass 
manipulation when alternative news sources are “at viewers’ fingertips” (Leshchenko 
2014:55). However, the role of civil society in toppling the communist regime in 1989 
is debated and from this the question of whether  “Internet revolutions may be 
overblown as well” (Morozov 2012:52) must also be asked. 
A report released by the NGO Internews Ukraine in 2013, before the spark of 
the mass protest, exposed the fact that Ukraine had moved down to fourth place in its 
press freedom, following Moldova, Georgia and Armenia amongst Eastern 
Partnership countries (Miller 2013). On a global scale the change proved to be drastic: 
Ukraine had downgraded from 89
th 
(2009) to 126
th
 (2013) in the Press Freedom Index 
of 179 countries (Leshchenko 2014). Under these circumstances we can infer that 
mass media lost its ability to provide objective and unbiased information whereas 
social media could provide a platform for freedom of speech and expression.  
For the supreme effect of social media usage in the protest, the following are 
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necessary: “enough discontent” in the rest of population to motivate them to take 
action; a muted government's reaction and documentation of events which would 
provide an international outreach (Shirky 2009). Unlike Lohmann’s notion that a 
muted reaction of the state power allows revolutions to grow (1994), the information 
cascade in the Ukrainian scenario shows a different pattern. It was the regime’s harsh 
suppression of the protest that actually contributed to its exponential growth. It also 
supports Shirky’s argument about “enough discontent” that boosts the effect of social 
media. As was already discussed in this paper, the unforeseeable violence (Kravets 
2013; Kruk 2014; Tucker 2013) shocked and ignited Ukrainians to join the protests. It 
was the event that in T. Kuran’s model of an unanticipated revolution had necessary 
social conditions to transform into a major event of social unrest as it triggered 
society’s concealed frustrations – a spark that started a fire (1989:61). The demand 
not to suspend signing the Association Agreement ultimately transformed into the 
demand to respect human rights and to provide social justice. Thus another title of the 
Euromaidan, “The Revolution of Respect”, was coined by a number of Ukrainian 
journalists (Paniotto 2014).  
The president’s  “underestimation” of the power of the Internet was a 
beneficial factor that eventually helped to achieve the resignation of the incumbents 
(Leshchenko 2014:55). Furthermore, an immediate dissemination of information via 
social media provided the necessary global outreach. So, can one agree with B. Etling 
that the Ukrainian case is a “successful bottom-up protest movement aided by the 
Internet” (2014)? In order to conclude on this question, we should take into 
consideration a pivotal aspect, which might be not fully covered when touting social 
media: the state’s capacity to utilize and influence social media. 
4.5 State power and digital media: challenges and threats 
C. Shirky, a proponent of social media as a positive force for democracy and 
political change, argues that due to the social media’s affordability and the speed of 
information diffusion, it has become an intrinsic part of an active and responsive 
society (2008) – “a fact of life for civil society worldwide” (2011) fueling “a third 
communications revolution” with access to a small personal computer (Steele & Stein 
2002:29). Social media has lowered the barriers, dismantled existing geographic 
boundaries and made communication easier and faster than in pre-Internet revolutions 
(Kuksenok 2014). However, the mere availability of technology is not a guarantee of 
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social and political change as it can neither change the current state of affairs “for 
(and instead of you)” (Bauman 2012) nor lead to peace on its own (Steele & Stein 
2002).  
C. Kedzie states that technology is a “predictor of democracy” (2002:121). 
However, ICTs’ implications are often understudied as autocrats strive to keep the 
pace of technological development for their advantage (Diamond 2012). After 
receiving criticism about neglecting failures of social media, C. Shirky changed the 
tone of argumentation saying that social media's impact is a contributing factor in the 
long-run (2011). Possibilities of technology are significant, but should not be “loaded 
with unrealistic expectations” (Faris 2008:9).  
As stated above, social media can ensure the international coverage thus 
enriching mediascapes (Appadurai 1996). Social media raises awareness globally 
about local issues (Hill 2013) and, moreover, converts its users into producers of news 
as well. There are “twin revolutions” going on when users both embrace ease of 
creation as well as content sharing with a global audience (Zuckerman 2008). Yet one 
should not lose  “sight of more traditional media” (Fischer 2013:27) as it is valuable 
in the studies of media's impact on the course of democratization. Moreover, it 
appears to be more influential in promoting democratic citizenship whereas the 
Internet serves mainly as an entertainment tool and polarizes already polarized groups 
(Aday et. al. 2010; Best & Wade 2009). As was discussed before, a large segment of 
protesters were driven to the Maidan after seeing TV coverage of police brutality 
(Onuch 2014). We can develop an argument about the power of television in 
supplying vivid visul and audial content that calls to the audience's senses and 
emotions. However, one should also take into consideration the fact that social media 
content has very similar characteristics to television – appealing to emotions. As 
pointed out by the activist M. Onipchenko,  
“as any other mass media tool, Facebook and alike are driven by sensation: 
the worse and the scarier –  the better”(Interview 2). 
With similar criteria for content selection, yet with a different aganda, a 
dramatic shift from printed press and television to social media was impelled with a  
search for non-state controlled information. While Ukrainian oligarchs were buying  
media outlets and establishing censorship (Pishkovtsij 2013), two-thirds of Ukrainians 
turned to the Internet instead of mass media (Leshchenko 2014). Cyber attacks on 
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journalists as well as attempts to discredit a leading investigative newspaper, 
Українська Правда (“Ukrainska Pravda”) (Miller 2013), can be perceived as the 
factors that intensified the process of mass media losing its credence.  
One of the advantages of the Internet is that information can “slip” (Richards 
2002:165) whereas in mass media, “past communication technologies”, it cannot 
(Kedzie 2002: 106). An absolute control of the data flow is not possible on the highly 
interconnected web where a message has multiple routes to reach a recipient (Garrett 
2006; Diamond 2012).  Social media has an “immunity to government’s censorship” 
as observed in earlier uprisings when the government’s efforts to censor and block 
information did not succeed (Ali 2011:210). In addition, efforts to do so cause 
resistance of the online community thus the Internet appears to be a cumbersome tool 
for social control (Diamond 2012; Krueger 2005). However, while online censoring 
might be complicated, jailing online activists is still a possible solution for 
governments to apply (Morozov 2012). 
And this notion leads us to the «cute cat theory» developed by E. Zuckerman. 
According to Zuckerman, as long as people would like to share banal content (i.e. 
pictures of their cats), activists have a gateway to use the same tools for political 
activism (2008). Restricting access to cats via blocking social media websites would 
inevitably lead to discontent amongst non-participants of protests. For instance, when 
Hosni Mubarak’s regime shut off the Internet and telecom service, it “redoubled 
protester’s efforts” (Nadler 2014) and, furthermore, resulted in non-activists “pouring 
into the streets”, because they felt deprived of essential communication tools 
(Wolman 2013). While the majority of web users prefer to utilize it for entertainment 
purposes and do not necessarily seek or engage in any political content (Best &Wade 
2009; Morozov 2012), it makes news sharing very efficient amongst those who are 
indeed interested in political matters. This “latent capacity of activism” means that 
protesters can express themselves due to a high number of non-activists present on the 
web (Zuckerman 2013:6). It can be very complex to block online participatory 
platforms which are used by millions of users to share texts, pictures and videos that 
are non-related to protests.  
“Everything happens so fast on Facebook that is seems to be very difficult to be able 
to manipulate it. If one decides to do so, such manipulation should have a very 
methodological approach,” says A. Savytska (Interview 1).  
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As governments cannot block only malign content (Zuckerman 2008), one 
should also consider the fact that they face a so called “dictator’s dilemma” (Kedzie 
2002). Communication aligns with political and economic efficacy as well as creates 
a perception that “the national government is effective” (Dafoe & Lyall 2015:10). 
Therefore, blocking information channels will inevitably have an effect on the state’s 
opportunities in the global arena. Censorship of political information has an economic 
impact as well since it hinders growth of the state (Clinton 2010). In contrast, one can 
also argue that this “dilemma” of a bad reputation and losing credence did not stop 
oppressive regimes from sending tanks, hiring snipers and suppressing marches in 
earlier uprisings (Morozov 2012). We should also take into account that an absolute 
blockade of the information flow might be replaced with another tactic – using the 
same tools as activists for spreading misinformation as well as spying on protesters. A 
target audience that does not participate in the protests might reconsider the 
probability of their participation when coming across such messages. “Sowing 
doubts” and creating “artificial splits” within communities might be more effective 
than actual censorship (Morozov 2012: 52).  
During the Euromaidan protests a number of bots used its hashtag to provoke 
and manipulate web users. For instance, such tweets as “I was invited to EuroMaidan. 
Was offered Hrv 100 (for participation). But I won’t go. I’d better go with my wife to 
the theatre” (Kapliuk 2013), were meant to spread deceitful information. Moreover, 
there were other techniques to manipulate web users’ information flows. Internet 
pages were replete with ad banners that encouraged protesters to get back to their 
daily routine, spread news about the danger of getting tuberculosis at the Maidan and 
provided links to spoof media (Minchenko 2013). Web users were encouraged by 
online activist groups to have their eyes open for lies and harmful information 
diffused via social media feeds, to report “prepaid” users as spam and block them 
(ibid; Pishkovtsij 2103).  
Technology also provides immense opportunities for surveillance. That can 
explain why expansion of the Internet is higher in the states where governments are 
more concerned about controlling information flows (Rød & Weidmann 2015). Being 
connected aligns with a diminished government’s respect for human rights when 
technology can serve an oppressor (Richards 2002:167). Consequently, access to 
digital media has two sides: serving as a mobilizing, coordinating tool or assisting 
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oppressive regimes in conducting surveillance. Z. Bauman coined the term “liquid 
surveillance”, which stands for the cooperation of web users with oppressors without 
being aware of it. Social websites, in his view, are “fields of voluntary do-it-yourself 
form of surveillance”, which are much move effective than any other spying methods 
(2012). Ubiquitous spying, illegal arrests, cruelty of police and listening to protesters’ 
mobile phones were highlighted in the open call from human rights organizations in 
Ukraine asking for immediate investigation (Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union 
2014). In the Ukrainian revolution not only was the national secret service interested 
in disclosing personal data of protesters through social media, but a foreign one was 
as well. The Russian Federal Security Service asked the founder of social media 
website Vkontakte to reveal the registration data of the Euromaidan organizers and 
supporters (Interfax 2014). In addition, during the first half of 2014 Russian 
authorities made a record number of requests to Twitter to remove some content 
regarding the Ukrainian revolution. As indicated in Twitter’s blog post, “we denied 
demands to limit speech about non-violent demonstrations in Ukraine” (Kessel 2015). 
On 16 January 2014 the Ukrainian parliament adopted a number of laws called by 
civil society “draconian”, which would enforce human rights violations and translate 
into severe restrictions on freedom of speech and gathering. According to one of the 
new laws, citizens that share information via social media were placed into the 
category of criminal and administrative responsibility for disseminating slander, 
without a clear explanation of what exactly such information would contain (ZIK 
2014). Moreover, law number 3879 would regulate online news agencies more 
closely and enable authorities to shut down a website without a court order (Reporters 
Without Borders 2014). In reaction to the new legislation Ukrainian civil activist K. 
Kruk wrote,  
“I can't understand that I, a 22-year-old Ukrainian, could become a criminal in my 
own country merely for sharing information and telling the truth” (2014).  
Surveillance and control of the web sphere means that incumbents can harness 
the power of technology on a new level as web users with their IP addresses and all 
necessary personal information are already on the web. In the Internet era there is no 
encryption technology that can secure one’s email address and social media accounts 
(Morozov 2012). During the Euromaidan computers of journalists who covered the 
revolution were hacked with short messages such as, “Wait until tomorrow. You will 
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want to drown yourself” (Miller 2013). One of the most infamous attacks resulted in 
the disclosure of the private files of O. Romaniuk, the director of the Institute for 
Mass Information, with their further exposure on a spoof online newspaper (Freedom 
House 2013). With the new laws banning free speech in Ukraine one could have been 
sentenced for up to 2 years. Therefore, we can question whether Kedzie’s dictator’s 
dilemma (2002) is applicable to the Ukrainian case when officials attempted to pass 
laws predicted to lead the country into a dictatorship (Reporters Without Borders 
2014). It is particularly interesting that the governmental respect for human rights 
decreases according to their increased fear of a domestic threat (Richards 2002). In 
addition, the mere fact of exposure to the world does not translate into less violence 
(Morozov 2012) as the Ukrainian revolution proves as well. 
On 21 January 2014 everybody who was at Independence Square received an 
SMS message with the following text: “Dear subscriber, you’re registered as a 
participant of mass disturbances.” The message was distributed from an unknown 
number to all mobile operators (24tv.ua 2014). This “probably the most Orwellian 
message” (Merchant 2014) reminds us that it does not take much effort for 
governments to track citizens’ movements and to remind them that  “the Big Brother 
is watching” (Steele & Stein 2002:41). We can also reflect on Foucault’s Panopticon 
metaphor, which is significant in surveillance studies as technology “expands 
potentials for surveillance” (Lee & Cook 2014:2). One could compare the Panopticon 
prison design to modern society where “prisoners” are unaware of being watched.  
However, according to A. Savytska, the SMS message did not have the necessary 
frightening effect that the government expected as the people had already felt their 
power to resist oppression (Interview 1). In addition, according to Turkish sociologist 
Z. Tufekci, the Panopticon metaphor “has little to do with surveillance in liberal 
democracies” as we do not live in the prison and are free to express ourselves (2014). 
But the fear of surveillance, which might potentially lead to self-censorship, appears 
to be applicable. Even if authoritarian governments overestimate their capabilities, the 
anxiety of being watched and tracked could be restrictive and halt activists from 
posting online (Morozov 2012:146). Hence, when debating about the role of social 
media as a liberating technology one should take into account that it could be used for 
oppression with the same success as for democratization.  
Social media functions in “genuinely pennies-from-heaven-style, for every 
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dictator and his secret services” (Bauman 2012). Principally, when web users give out 
their personal information or censor themselves. Therefore, the mere availability of 
platforms as free and uncontrolled spaces for sharing content and expressing opinions 
appears to be an assumption that requires further consideration (Morozov 2012).  We 
should also pay special attention to how offline spaces and connections between 
people are translated into digital movements. The next section examines to what 
extent online and offline networks are intertwined and how they affect each other. 
4.6 We are #EuroMaidanFamily 
“Jack Dorsey, Mark Zuckerberg and their companions-in-arms are the 
generals of the advancing Democracy-and-Human-Rights Army – and we all, 
tweeting and sending Facebook messages, are its soldiers” (Bauman 2012). These 
ironic lines illustrate how the mere availability of communication is perceived to 
provide solutions for struggles for human rights and democracy. In contrast, one can 
think about it in a different context: “nobody would go to the barricades to die for a 
tweet” (Kuksenok 2014).  
Even though social media platforms in Ukraine were “buzzing” with 
discussions about a big protest, initially it was highly questionable whether it would 
be translated into significant numbers of people actually coming to the Maidan (Hirst 
2013).  To reflect on this issue, we can take into account M. Gladwell’s critique of so-
called Twitter revolutions (2010) as well as a discourse on “small clusters” (Faris 
2008). The “small clusters” hypothesis suggests that groups of people are “clustered” 
around the same interests and locales and it is challenging to bridge and make them 
cooperate (Faris 2008:6). In addition, M. Gladwell argues that social media is made of 
weak ties and it hinders mass mobilization (2010). With an example of Leipzig 
demonstrations in 1989 he shows that protesters were “critical friends” who motivated 
each other to join unrest (ibid). The “Facebook revolution” in Egypt in 2008 owes its 
achievements to offline roots, which were “vastly amplified by the Facebook 
activists” (Shapiro 2009). In addition, reflecting on the evolvement of the social 
movement in Egypt, activist Gigi Ibrahim says that calling it a “Facebook revolution” 
is “simply bogus” (England 2011). Therefore, one might suggest that “small clusters”, 
not an anonymous crowd, spur protests. Back in 1989 they did not have a mobile 
connection. Neither did they have Facebook or Twitter. Even hypothetically assuming 
they did, can we estimate to what extent the critical mass would grow solely due to 
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social media friendships, comments and shares? Allegedly, social media fosters 
information cascades (Shirky 2009) and assists in exposing a malignant regime thus 
driving crowds to protest, when their threshold of safety (Granovetter 1978) is 
reached. Yet, once actively functioning, information cascades do not necessarily 
depend on social media anymore as they become self-sustainable (Fischer 2013:11).  
The Ukrainian case contributes to the existent debate concernig the weak and 
strong ties between protesters. As research of Oxford University proves, the majority 
of protest participants came to the Maidan with their friends and family and because 
of their friends and family. 46% of the protest participants joined after their friend or 
relative texted them; 40% came because of friends’ or relatives’ call on Facebook 
(Onuch 2014). Therefore, close personal connections were the principal drivers for 
the crowds to join the Euromaidan protests (ibid). Activist M. Onipchenko organized 
a small-scale protest in Leipzig, eastern Germany, by attracting networks of 
“acquaintances” first and then making use of Facebook to spread information about 
the protest. 
“I think that everything should be based on personal relationships. You listen to those 
from your closest circle whom you respect and who say “let’s go”. From my own 
experience I’ve noticed that for the most of young progressive Ukrainians the main 
question before joining the Euromaidan was who else is coming” (Interview 2). 
It is unclear how online weak connections can foster strong social pressure; yet such 
weak connections can facilitate collective action (Hampton 2003, cited in Garrett 
2006:209). This explanation is likely to be viable when analyzing how Facebook was 
harnessed for boosting action during the Euromaidan protests. Responding to the 
question about reasons for joining the revolutionary movement, A. Savytska says: 
“People made a decision to go to the Maidan not because of the invitations on 
Facebook. Nobody posted: “Come, we need your help”. Facebook posts were about 
what the Maidan needs:  sandwiches, buckwheat, firewood etc.” (Interview 1). 
Likewise, the website galas.com.ua informed the public about necessities for 
the protest (food, petrol, clothes etc) with infographics. Collective action and 
participation were built upon the desire to help and assist in the movement. And, 
remarkably, such small contributions led to prolonged participation as individuals felt 
more commitment and certainty that their action made a positive impact (Garrett 
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2006). One can also consider the importance of equality that social media provides. 
Every individual feels free to act and express his opinions knowing that regardless of 
his status offline, he can be a change maker and a leader online, “a pamphleteer” of 
the XXI century (Berkman 2006:177). ICTs reduce the importance of institutions 
(Garrett 2006) by “killing vertical hierarchies spontaneously” (Mason 2011). It is a 
pivotal benefit of digital technologies to enable cooperation between individuals 
without segmentation and hierarchical divisions (Hill 2013:42). Such “peer-to-peer” 
communication channels (Rød & Weidmann 2015:3) appear to make mass 
mobilization more feasible. The Ukrainian Euromaidan therefore should be analyzed 
with a reference to its “networked horizontalism”  (Hill 2013; Karpyak 2013; Mason 
2011) that brought together different individuals on equal terms. 
On the other hand, one should not take the web as something foreign to 
hierarchical formations. As S. Hill claims in the same book, it is not a “magic antidote 
to hierarchy” (2013: 138). There is a person who “sets the fire”, and who gathers 
followers around a common idea, as pointed out by M. Onipchenko (Interview 2). 
Likewise, the net is the same platform for struggle, influence and authority as reality 
is (Hill 2013). In addition to this discussion, one might also intertwine arguments 
about scale-free networks. The most popular bloggers attract followers and media 
creating “preferential attachment” (Watts, cited in Faris 2008: 4). The blogosphere is 
less effective than Facebook in mobilizing people since it is made of poorly connected 
nodes that vary in their strength (2008). However, we suggest that Facebook and 
Twitter have the same types of stronger and more influential nodes as the blogosphere 
has. An anonym who posts a call for a protest might not have a chance to create vivid 
discussions and have such an impact as a renowned opinion leader (Mustafa Nayem, 
for instance). And we could add that most probably it was through M. Nayem’s strong 
ties that a dense and influential network (Granovetter 1973) was developed. 
ICTs enable loosely coupled networks to interact with each other and to 
mobilize collective action (Garrett 2006). Small clusters, discussed earlier, can be 
bridged with other small clusters thus strengthening and finding a common ground for 
action. These micro examples, small-scale interpersonal networks, can be further 
“translated into large-scale patterns” (Granovetter 1973:1360). This is what solidified 
the protests Leipzig in 1989. This is also what happened during the Euromaidan when 
“bridging social capital” (Shirky, cited in Faris 2008:7) made small clusters transform 
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into one active force cooperating for a common cause. According to the working 
report on the impact of the Euromaidan on Ukraine’s politics and society, “Ukraine 
saw an expansion of the public sphere via the Internet” (Pishchikova & Ogryzko 
2014:5).  This conclusion supports the argument about the emergence of the digital 
public sphere, a “networked” one, which makes consumers active observers of social 
spheres and participants in political conversation (Benkler, cited in Ali 2011:217) due 
to access and convenience of using social media as communication tools. 
“It would be very complicated for strangers to mobilize without social media. When 
the fight gets more serious, social media becomes a more effective instrument for 
society’s organization and resistance against authorities,” argues M. Onipchenko 
(Interview 2). 
Hence, coming back to M. Gladwell’s critique of Facebook as a network of 
weak ties, we might also consider that through these weak ties small clusters can meet 
and cooperate. Even though the hubs of activity are small-scale dense networks, it 
might be on social media that they find the common ground and multiple their impact. 
In Kyiv, units of residents of the same districts used Facebook groups to coordinate 
daily duties and prevent violence during the revolution. However, one should keep in 
mind that people rarely react to information diffused via communication tools unless 
it “is also transmitted through personal ties” (Granovetter 1973: 1374). In the same 
vein, K. Kuksenok also found that almost every participant was brought to Maidan by 
personal connections. As indicated by Kuksenok, protest participants required “a trust 
signal” (a phone call, an SMS) and online social networks themselves lacked such 
signals (2013).  
Reflecting on A. Savytska’s motivation to go “to people and for people” during the 
revolution (Interview 1), we can elaborate on the phenomena of the Euromaidan as 
the place where cooperation and bonding with each other reached its pinnacle. Due to 
problems with mobile connection and Internet access during the first days of the 
protest, the Ukrainian Internet Association and mobile providers called upon residents 
of Kyiv to release their WiFi passwords (Den’ 2013). In addition, lists of a few 
dozens of free WiFi spots as well as places to get free food and hot drinks or take a 
shower (Vagner & Kramarenko 2013) were disseminated via social media.  
Small clusters of creative individuals could find each other in Facebook 
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groups dedicated exclusively to creating posters, leaflets and slogans. For instance, 
the information center НЕ ЗЛИй МАЙДАН (“Don't Ditch Maidan”) and Страйк 
плакат (“Strike placard”) (Bogdanova 2013) are still functioning and have expanded 
their creative initiatives to the issues of the annexation of Crimea and the war in 
eastern Ukraine etc.  Online encounters of small clusters were and still are fulfilled in 
offline projects. Vice versa, offline campaigns were promoted via social media to 
share information. In this respect, it is noteworthy to examine how small clusters 
detached from their homeland, diasporas, reacted to the events happening in Ukraine 
as well as whether the international audience responded to the Euromaidan. 
4.7 Euromaidan: spreading worldwide  
The earlier discussed networks, built offline and online within Ukrainians, 
represent the case on the national level. In order to get in-depth understanding of the 
power of social media, it is critical to pose a question as to how the networks were 
spread and reacted to abroad. It was already indicated that social media messages 
were, to a large extent, in English so that the global community could comprehend 
and respond to events happening in Ukraine (Barbera & Metzger 2013; Kuksenok 
2013). The communication process was not one-directional. A number of world 
celebrities, such as George Clooney (George Clooney supports Ukrainian 
demonstrators 2013), Vera Farmiga (Vera Farmiga message to Ukrainian protesters 
2013) and Arnold Schwarzenegger (Arnold Schwarzenegger sends a message to the 
Ukrainian people 2014) made Youtube messages to the Ukrainian protesters or 
tweeted about the protests in Ukraine (Wenn 2014).  
Analyzing the impact of social media flows abroad, we come to an 
understanding that this sets a basis for further discussion about collective identity 
building and diasporas reacting to events happening in their homeland. One might 
want to draw parallels with the invention of the telegraph, “Victorian Internet”, which 
connected people in different locations “into a broader collective imagination” 
(Lester, cited by Potter 2007:627). In the ICT age diaspora become digital, following 
events and communicating with their country of origin via the Internet and 
smartphones (Brinkenhoff 2009). Affective bonding with the homeland, K. 
Brinkenhoff argues, is propelled and emphasized by emotions that make an individual 
keep and develop those linkages (ibid). In the special circumstances of civil unrest 
and governmental violence in Ukraine, emotions of the digital diasporas might have 
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reached their peak. It is in particular due to social media, M. Onipchenko states, 
which initiate an emotional overflow.  
“They shake you up very much. When you are constantly on Facebook, your nerves 
are on the edge: you make posts and panic. Social media flows draw you in and 
exhaust. The instrument, which is supposed to be helpful, eventually does not make 
much sense. It just gives you an illusory feeling of partaking” (Interview 2). 
Creation of the collective imagination leads us to further reflections on the 
“imagined reality” constructed by mediascapes (Appadurai 2000). A. Appadurai 
introduced his concept of mediascapes referring to mass media (Appadurai 1996; 
2000). However, the same definition of the flows of “image-centered, narrative based 
accounts of strips of reality” (ibid: 1996:35) can be applied to social media as well. 
Mediscapes might interlace with ideoscapes and, in the case of the Euromaidan, call 
for action. The #DigitalMaidan initiative was meant to reach the global audience in 
the US, Canada, Latin America and the EU and to invoke a reaction. Africa, Australia 
and Asia were not taken into consideration, assumingly, due to smaller Ukrainian 
diaspora.  
ICT can “teach people” how to organize their efforts to collectively contribute 
to political and social change (Best & Wade 2009:257). #DigitalMaidan had a clear-
cut communications strategy with premade tweets available on its website. A Twitter 
storm launched on 27 January 2014 was addressed to media, politicians and 
international organizations to call for international sanctions. The selection of 
countries for this strategic communication appears to be dependent on the 
transnational networks of activists in the states that are more responsive to Ukraine. 
The Twitter storm was aimed at, one could argue, putting pressure on the Ukrainian 
authorities by causing “a boomerang effect” (Keck & Sikkink, cited in Aday et al. 
2010:24). Owing to ICT, repressive regimes are unable to disclose their misconduct 
“as successfully as before” since diaspora can easily broadcast violations of human 
rights and freedoms in their home country to the outer world and encourage 
international pressure (Kedzie 2002:123). This suggestion makes us reflect on the 
dictator’s dilemma (ibid 2002): foreign censure of the authority’s misconduct might 
have an influence on the regime’s further decisions and change the course of 
repressive actions. The #Digitalmaidan hashtag “topped worldwide Twitter trends” 
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(Lyushnevskaya 2014). However, the impact on the regime and the return in action is 
still to be studied. 
One can suggest that the chief sources of information for diaspora were their 
relatives and friends in Ukraine, “strong ties”, or the Internet and social media due to 
a limited access to Ukrainian mass media abroad. By being exposed to the same 
information in the social media flow, communities abroad created their own 
understanding of the revolution built on images transmitted by media (Appadurai 
1996). A. Appadurai argues that the further the audience is from the core, the more 
likely it is to construct its “imagined world”. As the perception of the motherland can 
be one-sided, existing only “in the image of the deterritorialized groups”, 
communities detached from their usual environment “invent” their homeland to a 
certain extent (ibid: 49). 
From this, we can elaborate on the collective national identity building of 
Ukrainians residing abroad. “Networked sociability” breaks organizational and spatial 
borders and leads to consolidation based on “choice and affinity” (Castells, 
Fernandez-Ardevol & Qiu 2006:144). Small clusters of Ukrainians residing abroad 
form their collective identity based on their nationality, social ties as well as shared 
norms and values. M. Onipchenko argues that Ukrainians who move abroad become 
more aware of their belonging than those who live in Ukraine,  
“People that move to other countries reveal their national identity. You 
realize much more better who you actually are” (Interview 2). 
And this realization might contribute to imagined community (Anderson 
1991) building. If we see the nation as an imagined community, it is also “a form of 
self-consciousness” and “a form of identity”, which is a sense of belonging (Pool, 
cited in Éigeartaigh, Howard & Getty 2007:41). As globalization is paired with 
deterritorialization, which makes the world move from transformation to 
transcendence (Bude & Dürrschmidt 2010), we can suggest that nation as well as civil 
society building take place not necessarily only within the given borders of the state. 
Media in this case can connect emigrants who follow news from their homeland 
virtually and “invite them to “reimagine” a different sort of nation” (Darling 2008).  
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Such “reimagination” might spur activism and community building as can be 
proven with the examples of Ukrainian diaspora abroad. Organizing a theatrical 
flashmob in New York (NYC Maidan Theatrical Flash Mob 2014), lighting Niagara 
Falls in the colours of Ukrainian flag (Niagara Falls Lit Blue & Yellow in support of 
Euromaidan Ukraine 2013), establishing EuromaidanWache Berlin, an alternative 
embassy of Ukraine (Bondarenko & Zavgorodnya 2014), and other initiatives 
illustrate how Ukrainians mobilized abroad. The offline activity of diaspora held an 
exceptional significance as it may have raised awareness of those who were not 
exposed to the information flow coming from Ukraine. In this regard M. Onipchenko 
says that the mini-protest organized in Leipzig was aimed at “shaking sleeping 
Europe”,  
“Before we went out into the streets, many of them had not been interested in 
our region. What was faraway eventually became familiar for them” (Interview 2). 
ICTs assist in nurturing collective identity building (Garrett 2006), which 
results in collective action when such is needed. It is likely that the process might be 
reversed: a call to collective action could foster and strengthen collective identity 
building. According to M. Onipchenko, a “side effect” of the diaspora’s protest in 
Leipzig happened to be community building among Ukrainians themselves (Interview 
2). The protests organized in Leipzig allowed Ukrainians who had never seen each 
other before to meet and cooperate, and this cooperation is still ongoing. Facebook 
basically awakened “dormant social ties” and “musty acquaintances” (Faris 2008:7) 
as well as created new ties. Due to the Euromaidan events, more Ukrainians joined 
Ukrainians in Leipzig Facebook group as stated by M. Onipchenko (Interview 2). 
This fact supports J. A. Tucker’s argument about the “two-way effect” of social media 
when more people are driven to online communication tools (2014).  
Such argumentation calls for elaboration on small clusters and strong-weak 
ties, terms introduced previously. One can define Ukrainian diaspora as social clusters 
dispersed worldwide. Regardless of distance, these people can connect by using 
digital communication tools. F. Cairncross elaborated on “the death of distance” 
driven by globalization and the consequent communications revolution (1997). The 
“Global Village” (McLuhan 1966) or the “small world phenomenon” (Faris 2008) 
discussions are relevant to the analysis of social movements taking root in one place 
and having repercussions worldwide. Social media reduces transaction costs for 
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organizing collective action “across physical and social borders” (Aday et al. 2010: 
11) as “distance-dissolving” technology fosters transnational networks (Kedzie 
2002:106). P. Mason states that earlier, people “would ride hanging on the undersides 
of train carriages across borders just to make links like these” (2011). 
M. McLuhan also foresaw that a small revolution might happen even in the 
kitchen as long as there is a personal computer (1966). However, we must also take 
into consideration the fact that online activism is not necessarily linked to an offline 
activism. Especially if geographically distant, an individual might follow news from 
his home country, but do a little or nothing to participate in an uprising either being 
short of resources or simply being unaware of how he could contribute. A consumer 
of information might become an active participant because of the non-static nature of 
ICT that is a “dynamic space in which you can play a role” (Ali 2011:215). However, 
although it is easier to express one’s discontent or support of a protest with social 
media, it is also more complicated for that expression to have any influence (Gladwell 
2010). It is problematic for us to estimate the ratio of online followers and the actual 
impact of Ukrainians abroad. According to O. Tregub, activism of diaspora 
significantly increased in comparison with the Orange Revolution (Nonviolent 
conflict 2014). Besides organizing protests, writing letters and petitions to the 
governments of respective countries, Ukrainians collected food, medicine and money 
to send to the protesters back home (ibid). Such activism can be linked to the 
strengthened sense of national belonging and awareness of one’s roots as well as the 
necessity to be a part of a larger social group. When asked to what extent activism in 
Leipzig was beneficial for Euromaidan in Kyiv, M. Onipchenko says that apart from 
raising awareness in eastern Germany and building stronger ties, the protests had a 
multistage effect. 
“The protests changed us. We changed our circle of people with whom we 
communicated. Consequently, we had an impact on an overall course of the 
revolution and the state of Ukraine” (Interview 2). 
5. Discussion 
5.1 “Thank you, Facebook” 
 
There is one photo snapped during the Arab Spring showing a bearded man 
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with a cardboard sign saying “Thank you, Facebook” (Engel, cited in Zuckerman 
2013:1). This image might be a quintessence of the whole sentiment about the role of 
social media in social uprisings. When O’Reilly coined the term Web 2.0 he meant 
that the power of networks must be harnessed by the Internet to allow the co-creation, 
collaboration and participation of committed users (2009). However, such online 
activity spills over into reality and it appears that the line between the Internet and 
offline life has blurred to such a degree that one has doubts about what is more 
powerful. Does the Internet strengthen one’s networks? Does it assist in mobilization 
and drive social change? Or is merely a tool that is amongst many others that activists 
can utilize for communicating their message? Does it perhaps hinder offline activism? 
Wael Ghonim, an Egyptian activist, titled his book about the Arab Spring “Revolution 
2.0”. A new age of technology significantly transforms the way we think about social 
uprisings, yet the questions stated above lead us to considerations of to what extent a 
Facebook revolution or alike could be valid terms. 
The Ukrainian Euromaidan was also hyped as a new Revolution 2.0. we can see it in 
protesters’ posts that are full of gratitude to technology for taking their revolt to 
different level.  
“Talking about ‘sponsors’ of Maidan:  I’d like to express gratitude to one Jew, who 
contributed immensely to the birth of the Ukrainian nation. Mr. Zuckerberg – plus to 
your karma!” (eds Myrhorodskiy & Savytska 2014:61). 
“Zuckerberg, dude, happy birthday! And thank you. […] Facebook started Maidan, a 
revolution, a war, and, I believe, a collapse of the totalitarian system is nearby” (eds 
Myrhorodskiy & Savytska 2014:697). 
Yet if putting every upcoming uprising into the frame of Web 2.0, we are in 
danger of narrowing down the complexity of social mobilization and networks to a 
few personalities and a few digital tools that they developed. It appears that “the real 
credit for social change should go to the heads of transnational corporations such as 
Facebook and Twitter” (Hill 2013:12). However, as the Ukrainian Euromaidan and 
other uprisings demonstrated, there are other factors, such as personal calls or mass 
media messages that have to be taken into consideration when discussing triggers of 
mobilization. In addition, ties built through social media cannot guarantee efficiency 
of an outreach needed for the empowerment of the crowds. W. Ghonim who initiated 
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the We Are All Khaled Said page on Facebook states that the Arab Spring did not 
happen on social media, as “the ultimate aspiration was to take the action onto the 
street” by means of social media (cited in Hill 2013:118). When asked whether the 
Euromaidan happened “thanks to” social media, the editor of the “Phantom Pain 
#maidan” states that it is an exaggeration to use such wording since social media is 
one of many contributing factors, but not the most pivotal one. 
“The most important instrument is people. If we did not have Facebook, people would 
invent something different. Luckily or unluckily, but everything depends solely on 
people” (Interview 1). 
Facebook activist M. Onipchenko agrees on this point, saying that social 
media is the instrument without which it would be complicated for strangers to find 
each other and cooperate on the same matters (Interview 2). Reflecting on the Arab 
Spring, D. Walman writes that success of the uprising showed what could happen 
when social uprising is combined with “brave citizenry” and social media (2013). He 
concludes the same as A. Savytska does, saying that “social networks don’t overthrow 
governments—people do” (ibid). This study of the Euromaidan elaborates on offline 
ties and networks that eventually bring an uprising into being. Statistics collected by 
the Oxford University group display the importance of linkages between people – 
small clusters, which, if brought together, can become an immense power.  
The intrinsic study of the Ukrainian revolution raises further inquires as to 
what extent pre-Internet models of collective behavior and mobilization are applicable 
to the modern age. One can see that by utilizing digital tools, Ukrainian society added 
to and moved beyond the threshold models and informational cascades presented 
earlier (Granovetter 1978; Kuran 1989; Lohmann 1994). The threshold of safety 
acquired a new interpretation: the core of the violent confrontation appeared to be the 
safest place. A. Savytska argued that “people lost their fear” (Interview 1) and one 
can assume that it was linked to the social media for at least three reasons. Firstly, it 
showed dramatic pictures of confrontation creating an intensive emotional flow. 
Secondly, it displayed the needs of people at Maidan calling for contributions of food, 
clothes, wood etc. Thirdly, it showed how many people planned to join the uprising 
thus creating a sense of community and collective participation as well.  
Such considerations make one ponder whether social media is “just a tool” 
(Gladwell 2010; Hill 2013). Z. Tufekci is very critical of this notion stating that the 
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impact of digital technology as well as the impact of nuclear weapons cannot be put 
into the category of “just tools”. “A few would say it doesn’t matter if we fight with 
sticks, knives, guns, or nuclear weapons” (2014). M. Gladwell argues, “the revolution 
will not be tweeted” (2010). However, the emergence of Twitter or other social media 
platforms has dramatically changed the way uprisings are coordinated.  
5.2 Bravo millennials 
Another popular thought about triggers of modern revolutions is that they are 
driven by the millennial generation. Deriving from the considerations about 
Revolution 2.0, technology-savvy young people can be considered the fuel of the 
Ukrainian uprising. It appears that students were the first to express their discontent 
and it was the “mood of joy on the Maidan” (Kozloff 2014) that united young people. 
However, M. Onipchenko argues that there is nothing novel about it as it was mainly 
young, progressive people who started big revolutions in the pre-Internet era as well. 
However, the early joiners of the Euromaidan were not only young people:  
“Certainly, this revolution does not belong exclusively to the intelligent youth. 
There were people from the godforsaken villages, who set the fire to cook soup and 
sat in the tents throughout the revolutionary nights. They spent money in costly Kyiv, 
ate whatever and slept on the ground. What for? If they were ready to give so much 
for the idea, then what should my surrounding of millennial Ukrainians, that live in 
warms apartments, drive cars and come to the Maidan  for 1-2 hours after work, have 
done?” (Interview 2). 
Apart from the question of triggering an uprising, a more critical inquiry is 
who sustains revolutions and the Ukrainian Euromaidan displays diverse 
demographics. The study conducted by Oxford University showed that the average 
age of the protester was 36 years old and, moreover, the participation rate of students 
dramatically decreased throughout the course of the uprising (2014). Consequently, if 
is was not solely youth that led the revolution, then one could also question the role of 
technology: either it is given too much credence, or the older generation has become 
more tech-educated that one previously assumed.  
The fact that the millennial generation is tech-savvy does not mean per se that 
this generation is willing to invoke and lead protests. As S. Hill argues, the millennial 
generation’s augmented actions for self-expression online do not necessarily have 
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origins in reality (2013). In addition, one could inquire as to whether their activity 
online can have a spillover into reality. Ukrainian journalist M. Nayem, believed to be 
amongst the first ones to cause social unrest, states that he did not expect participation 
of the millennial generation when he made his call for a gathering. “Today’s youth” 
were so glued to their computers and smartphones that they would never bestir 
themselves to undertake civic activism “in real life,” said M. Nayem in his interview 
(Diuk 2014:85). 
This statement urges us to start a discussion about a difference between online 
and offline activism. Online activism might be restricted due to “a constrained set of 
actions” (Garrett 2006: 215). But even more menacing is that web users might take 
satisfaction in this set and consequently be unwilling to move beyond. As argued by J. 
Heawood, social media platforms give an illusion that civil activism requires a very 
small commitment: “All you have to do is hit "retweet", and the world will 
immediately become a better place” (2012).  Setting or joining a Facebook page could 
be a one-off action without further consequences (Faris 2008; Morozov 2009). Such 
slacktivism is “the ideal type of activism for a lazy generation” (Morozov 2009) that 
appears to be “a toothless” and a safe way (Bauman 2012) to express one’s discontent 
without actual engagement.  
“A number of people that said online ‘yes, we should come and help’ is not equal to 
the number of people that actually came and helped”, argues A. Savytska outlining 
the difference between online and offline activism (Interview 1).  
However, proponents of online activism present cogent arguments as well. S. 
Hill states that awareness about the insufficiency of online activism is increasing 
amongst “angry, realistic and courageous people” (2013:13). Furthermore, the 
existence of slacktivism does not deprive more committed Internet users from using 
online tools to facilitate offline actions (Shirky 2011). Online activism is not ample, 
yet it can be fruitful “if used as a part of wider struggles” (Hill 2013:117). It is 
difficult to estimate how many slacktivists participated in the Ukrainian revolution. 
However, one could suggest that the Ukrainian case shows a spillover of online 
activism into reality with the emergence of groups that aimed at utilizing digital tools 
for offline cooperation.  
Pursuing our discussion on the connection between tech-friendliness and the 
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age range of protesters during the Euromaidan, we conclude that social media usage is 
not limited to the young generation only. In an attempt to prove that the Euromaidan 
protests can be titled Revolution 2.0, P. Nadler suggests that we are exposed to “the 
maturation of social media” when Twitter and Facebook are not used exclusively by 
youth (2014). This leads us to one of the observations published in “Phantom Pain 
#maidan”: 
“Two men, each of them seems to be slightly over 50, are approaching me. I catch 
one remark from their conversation: ‘I can’t get it at all how Lenin managed to make 
a revolution without Internet!’” (eds Myrhorodskiy & Savytska 2014:43). 
A recent study of the Internet usage in developing countries confirms that 
tech-savvy people are well-educated, young individuals who are 18-34 years old 
(PewResearch Center 2015). Hence, we take the argument about the maturation of 
social media in Ukraine very cautiously. Moreover, example of the Orange 
Revolution displays that the absence of social media tools does not hinder crowds 
from coming to the protests regardless of their age and occupation.  
6. Concluding remarks: lessons and prospects 
“Love to your motherland is like a phantom pain. This feeling is difficult to describe 
and give it a definition” (eds Myrhorodskiy & Savytska 2014:41). 
Social media in the course of a revolution could be compared to a phantom as 
well. Its role is difficult to grasp as it has an intricate nature, parts of which can easily 
slip away from a researcher, especially considering the fact that we conducted a 
research while relying on theories from the pre-Internet era. The digital age has 
significantly changed the way social mobilization is perceived and this transformation 
requires further study and analysis. 
This paper was aimed at exploring the ways in which social media affected 
and assisted the social uprising in Ukraine (Euromaidan) in 2013-2014. O. Onuch 
suggests that social media had “unprecedented” levels of influence in comparison to 
earlier uprisings around the globe (2014).  Our intention was to examine the social 
media phenomenon in regard to its diverse facets. In this intrinsic study we aimed at 
examining the case of the Euromaidan that contributes to the overall discussion on 
social media as a trigger of mass mobilization. Deriving from the data obtained we 
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can see that there are clearly identified benefits that digital media tools contributed 
with: fostering the speed of communication amongst people and simplifying 
collective action. Ukrainian online initiatives and rapidly launched platforms for 
sharing news and ideas about the uprising’s development appear to have made the 
Euromaidan a phenomenon of not only bringing down the existing regime, but rather 
building up a new civil structure (Diuk 2014). It became a new phase in creating a 
society that is empowered to take politics into its own hands. However, the formation 
of an online community of campaigners might not necessarily be translated into 
offline action as discussed in this paper. Technological tools, although used for 
uprisings, can cause ignorance or less concern about political issues as web users are 
occupied with an immense flow of online entertainment (Aday et. al. 2010; Best & 
Wade 2009). This is a challenge for everybody who aspires to utilize social media for 
mass mobilization. Still, this characteristic of the web is beneficial for those who want 
to avoid censorship (Zuckerman 2008) as controlling and banning online content is 
more and more cumbersome task for authorities.  
This research started with a critical observation that social media might be 
given too much credence for triggering social uprisings. S. Hill argues that the 
Internet has had an immense influence on the way we communicate; yet it is not 
likely to be a “cause of social change” (2013:14). The data presented in this paper 
suggests that fueling a revolution depends to a large extent on social bonding offline, 
which may or may not have exposure on social media platforms. A. Granovetter’s 
collective threshold (1978) as well as T. Kuran’s preference falsification theory 
(1989) were created in the pre-Internet age and demonstrated how the number of 
protesters can affect further amplification of an uprising. When elaborating on the 
safety threshold (Granovetter 1978) one can see in this case study that such a peak of 
society’s discontent was reached that it caused a “domino effect” (ibid: 1424): more 
and more individuals joined the revolutionary bandwagon encouraged by an 
escalation and a shared sentiment thus catching the authorities by surprise. Yet the 
surprise itself, “an unanticipated revolution” (Kuran 1989:61), was nothing but the 
frustration of individuals that had been suppressed or hidden and got revealed as soon 
as these individuals realized there were others who shared the same pleas (ibid). In 
regard to the incentives of Ukrainians to join the Euromaidan revolution due to social 
media coverage, it appears that emotional flow had a big impact on fostering this 
domino or the bandwagon effect. Society had accumulated its dissatisfaction to such 
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an extent that viral pictures and video of police violence towards student protesters 
took hundreds and thousands out into the streets. Therefore, we come to a 
consideration that “revolutions are processes, not events” (Wolman 2013) that still 
require a catalyst that can cause an uprising to come into being (Kuran 1989).  
It appears to be a very ambitious endeavor to start a revolution with a sole 
Facebook post if there is no fertile ground for an uprising to begin with. As evidence 
in this paper indicates, the strength of the Ukrainian public sphere and civil society 
seemed to be rather weak before the revolution started. However, we can infer from 
the existing examples that throughout the course of the Euromaidan, civil activism 
increased and social media created a digital public sphere which provided 
opportunities for cooperation between protesters and discussion of the new political 
solutions. It is essential to acknowledge that the role of leadership must be 
reevaluated as the network provides everybody with equal opportunities. Still, one 
should take arguments about the absence of hierarchies critically as the virtual reality 
also has its key opinion leaders and particular techniques to create boosts of attention 
and gather more people. In this regard, S. Lohmann’s information cascades model and 
the concept of a signaling game (1994) are particularly relevant as we can see that the 
“senders”, leaders of online communication in this case, can facilitate society’s 
reaction by sharing information that stimulates discontent within society. 
Twitter and Facebook were expected to get a Nobel Peace Prize for their 
contribution to the development of the Arab Spring (Blomfield 2011). Such ideas 
might make one think that the mere use of social media to share information can drive 
political change. As the activists of the uprisings argue themselves, there are more 
factors to add to make these tools efficient. A. Savytska states that social media 
platforms deserve an award for their assistance in social mobilization. But she also 
suggests that if Facebook did not exist, people would create another tool (Interview 
1). In addition, M. Onipchenko recommends awarding protesters, but not the 
communication instruments, as the number of people who use Twitter and Facebook 
in Ukraine is still not very high (Interview 2). This statement can be confirmed with 
the statistics of popularity of social media amongst web users (Dmytrenko 2015). 
With the intrinsic study of Ukraine we derive insights that can potentially be 
applicable to the role of social media in uprisings around the globe. Examining the 
difference between online linkages and personal connections as well as the potential 
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and threats that the Internet bears, we come to an understanding that one cannot 
simplify the formation of social unrest. It appears to be one-dimensional to perceive 
social media as a driver for social and political change as demonstrated by this study.  
This also makes us reflect on the sensitivity of the terminology that we use. As 
this paper exemplifies, the link between social and mass media is on a thin line of 
resemblance. We should be very cautious when separating those two since both of 
them are interrelated and determined by an appeal to human interest and emotional 
response. Furthermore, mass media is becoming more and more socially driven: 
inviting the audience to cooperate, to become citizen journalists and to provide media 
institutions with news and open editorial content. Thus we should be cautious with 
terms “traditional” and “new” media as we become more aware of fluidity and 
impermanence of the terms as time passes. In addition, one should not focus solely on 
Web 2.0 and digital media disregarding the fact that printed press and television do 
have their say in the course of uprisings. Especially since in Ukraine only 53% of the 
population “occasionally” accesses the Internet (PewResearch Center 2015). 
Nevertheless, this fact did not hinder thousands of people from coming to the Maidan. 
Apparently, other communication tools as well as personal networks were conducive 
to finding out about the protests. The early joiners of the Euromaidan were not only 
young people as this post, made on 1 December 2013, indicates:  
“… These people are not students. They are adult 40 year old guys. Most of them 
probably have no Facebooks-Twitters, but they took off and went [to Maidan] with 
their cars. Because they have what to lose… And whom to lose…” (eds Myrhorodskiy 
& Savytska 2014:24). 
Consequently, claiming that the Ukrainian revolution is another Facebook, 
Twitter or Millennial one is arguable.  
The study of the Ukrainian case gives us a ground for inferences about the role 
of social media in boosting cooperation, density of factors for triggering action and 
strengthening civil society engaged in the “networked public sphere” (Benkler 2006). 
Yet, when reflecting back on this work, we can also conclude that the study of the 
Euromaidan opens up a space for further research and debate about the relationship  
between online and offline activism; liquid surveillance (Bauman 2013); the role of 
mass media in a technologically driven society and, most importantly, consequences 
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of uprisings believed to be powered by social media. We drew conclusions about 
early joiners and sustainers of the revolution, information cascades in the digital age 
and embracing technology for civil society building according to the available 
statistics. However, this might not necessarily be applicable globally. When stating 
that revolutions happen “thanks to” advantages of Web 2.0 communication, we tend 
to disregard the fact that behind one particular event there is a vast number of factors, 
actors and a solid amount of time that eventually explode into a “revolution out of 
nowhere” (Kuran, cited in Onuch 2014:44). Moreover, every revolution has its 
specifics, which might not necessarily correspond to other movements worldwide. 
This paper highlights the contributive nature of social media in building 
transnational bonds and strengthening national identities of diaspora worldwide. The 
emergence of digital communities makes us evaluate how media- and ideoscapes 
challenge the idea of borders and make us reimagine community building, which 
ultimately predicts the emergence of “a globalized political community” (Kedzie 
2002:106). Although we have conducted the analysis in the frame of Global Studies 
and elaborated on the prominence of mediascapes and deterritorialization in the 
digital age, we would be hesitant to state firmly that the same trends are viable 
worldwide. Moreover, we must take into account that this is an emerging field of 
scholarship and not much work has been done so far to create new theories about 
mobilization and uprisings in the Internet era. Furthermore, it is particularly 
interesting to study what happens after revolutions. Where does the activism transfer: 
do leaders of an uprising go into politics or set up NGOs? Does a “networked public 
sphere” (Benkler 2006) function in the same way as it did during the uprising? How 
long are people willing to cooperate and what is the risk of “protest fatigue” to restrict 
their activity? These questions make one deliberate on the long-term effect of a short-
term uprising and its aftermath.  
The Ukrainian Euromadain has become a spark in the fire that changed the 
country and has had repercussions worldwide. The Ukrainian volume about 
revolution in Facebook posts, “Phantom Pain #maidan” could potentially serve as a 
history book to study the case. The same stands for the #Maidandaybyday initiative 
that recalls days of the revolution with textual and visual material on Twitter. It is a 
kind of a virtual museum that years after could take the audience back into those 
rebellious days. However, many of the social media initiatives were suspended after 
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the revolution or changed their focus to assisting fighting soldiers. The Euromaidan 
revolution could be a chance to build a true democracy in Ukraine (Leshchenko 2014) 
if civil society remains mobilized and pushing for reforms (Nonviolent conflict 2014).  
As we can infer from this study, mobilizing and pushing for reforms online could be 
the first step, but it requires a systematic offline campaign and a powerful network of 
strong ties to implement and sustain solid changes. 
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